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Abstract
Suite à l’harmonisation des règles matérielles dans le
cadre du règlement (CE) no. 1/2003, la Commission a
récemment commencé à se pencher sur la question de
l’harmonisation des règles de procédures et
de sanctions, alors que le Parlement européen a, en
janvier 2016, demandé l’introduction de sanctions
contre les personnes physiques. Ce dossier examine
l’état actuel des sanctions individuelles dans les États
membres, fait état des difficultés institutionnelles
posées par ces sanctions individuelles en particulier à
l’égard des programmes de clémence, et se penche sur
les avantages et inconvénients de l’introduction de
sanctions individuelles, en particulier de nature pénale.
Ce dossier examine l’expérience de la France,
de l’Allemagne, du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis
en matière de sanctions pénales et présente des
données empiriques ayant trait aux attitudes du public
dans différents États membres et aux États-Unis envers
les infractions au droit de la concurrence.
Following the substantive harmonisation in Regulation
(EC) no. 1/2003, the Commission has started more
recently to focus on procedure and sanctions, and in
January 2016, the European Parliament called for
penalties against natural persons. This ‘On Topic’ issue
looks at the current state of individual sanctions on the
Member State level, examines the institutional
challenges these individual sanctions present especially
for leniency programmes, and discusses the pros and
cons of introducing further individual, in particular
criminal sanctions. This ‘On Topic’ issue examines the
experience with criminal sanctions in France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States, and
presents empirical evidence on public attitudes towards
competition law infringements in various Member
States and the United States.

Introduction
Florian Wagner-von Papp*
f.wagner-von-papp@ucl.ac.uk

Reader in Law (Associate Professor), University College London (UCL), Faculty of Laws, London

1. Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 1/2003 aims at convergence of the substantive
competition laws in the Member States of the European Union. To be sure,
substantial differences between Member States’ laws remain in the areas of unilateral conduct and merger control.1 Yet in the area of anticompetitive agreements,
convergence has made great strides. National procedure and sanctions, however,
were largely excluded from the convergence goal of Regulation (EU) 1/2003,2 and
on the matter of individual sanctions the recitals merely state that “as regards
natural persons, they may be subject to substantially different types of sanctions
across the various systems.”3

* I would like to thank Wouter Wils and Florence Thépot for helpful comments.

1 For a criticism of the unilateral conduct exception to the convergence rule, see recently D. Hildebrand, Article 3
(2) in fine: Time for review, May 2015, Concurrences Review No. 2-2015, Art. No. 72323, www.concurrences.
com.
2 National procedure and sanctions only appear in the periphery. See Art. 5, 12 Regulation (EU) 1/2003.
3 Recital 16 (in the context of the exchange of information under Art. 12 Regulation (EU) 1/2003).
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On Topic

I. Overview
3. This On Topic issue seeks to contribute in two ways to
the discussion. First, it takes stock of the status quo with
regard to individual sanctions in the lex lata of some of
the biggest Member States in the European Union, and
the associated challenges. Second, it discusses the pros
and cons of increased individual, in particular criminal,
sanctions de lege ferenda, and the institutional issues
that will have to be addressed to fit such individual sanctions into the overall antitrust enforcement scheme in a
multi-jurisdictional context and make the enforcement of
individual sanctions effective.

4 A. Italianer, The ECN, convergence and enforcement of EU competition law:
achievements and challenges (3 October 2013), European Competition Day,
Vilnius, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2013_08_en.pdf.
5 Ibid.

4. I am delighted that an outstanding panel of experts
has agreed to contribute to this issue.
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2. In the course of the review of Regulation 1/2003,
the European Commission has now turned its attention to these matters of national procedure and sanctions. In 2013, the then-Director General for Competition remarked that despite some voluntary convergence
toward a level playing field, “bumps remain where procedures and sanctions are concerned.”4 Instead of relying
on soft convergence, the Commission considers introducing binding EU law,5 dubbed “Regulation 2” by the
current Vice-President of the German Bundeskartellamt.6
In May 2014, Vice-President Almunia announced that he
intended “to set in motion a reflection on how the system
has functioned so far and its future development” before
the end of his mandate,7 and in July 2014, the Commission published its Communication “Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives”8 with an accompanying Staff Working Document.9 One of the focal points
of this stock-taking exercise was the issue of individual
sanctions, and in particular the impact of the current
divergent approaches in the Member States on leniency
programmes.10 The most recent development in this
process is the launch of a public consultation that opened
in November 2015 and closed in February 2016.11

5. M. David Viros, Chief of Staff and Head of International and European Affairs at the Autorité de la concurrence examines criminal enforcement against individuals
in France and the interface with administrative enforcement. He highlights some of the challenges, in particular
the interaction between criminal enforcement by public
prosecutors and leniency programmes administered by
the Autorité.
6. Professor Daniel Zimmer of the University of Bonn,
former Chairman of the German Monopolkommission
(“Monopolies Commission”), describes the practice of
individual administrative fines for antitrust infringements and criminal enforcement against bid rigging
in Germany, and engages with the debate in Germany
about the criminalisation of hardcore cartels beyond
the bid-rigging offence. This debate has recently gained
momentum in Germany due to the Monopolies Commission’s recommendations.12 Professor Zimmer argues in
his contribution that more fact-finding is necessary, but
that the available evidence indicates that criminalisation
may well be necessary to achieve sufficient deterrence,
and that criminalisation should be accompanied by a
leniency programme for individuals, as well as possibly
a whistleblower programme with rewards13 or occupational bans for infringers similar to director disqualification orders.
7. Professor Bill Kovacic, Global Professor of Competition Law at George Washington University, Visiting
Professor at King’s College London, Non-Executive Director at the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the UK, and former Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission in the United States, provides
insights based on the experience in the United States. He
cautions that it is not enough to change the law in the
books to include a criminal offence, and draws attention to the importance of the gradual building of institutions. He outlines the long process it took for US criminal
enforcement to be where it is today. He points out the
need to understand the “institutional interdependencies”
of different features of the antitrust system, and that
tinkering with one aspect, namely introducing criminal
sanctions, may have repercussions and unintended consequences in other areas, such as the interpretation of the

6 K. Ost, From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: National Enforcement of EU
Cartel Prohibition and the Need for Further Convergence (2014) 5(3) Journal
of European Competition Law & Policy (JECLAP) 125–36.
7 J. Almunia, Honing the Instruments of EU Competition Control (15 May
2014), International Competition Law Forum, St. Gallen, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-378_en.htm.
8 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament
and Council, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003:
Achievements and Future Perspectives, COM(2014) 453 final (9 July 2014)
(the “Commission’s Ten Years Communication”).
9 Commission Staff Working Document, Enhancing competition enforcement
by the Member States’ competition authorities: institutional and procedural
issues, SWD(2014) 231 final (9 July 2014) (“Staff Working Document”).
10 See the Commission’s Ten Years Communication, n. 8, §§ 41, 42, 46; Staff
Working Document, n. 9, §§ 89–102.
11 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/
index_en.html

12 Monopolkommission, Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte, XX.
Hauptgutachten 2012/13 (2014) §§ 118–217, http://monopolkommission.de/
images/PDF/HG/HG20/HG_XX_gesamt.pdf with an English summary in
§§ 18–28 of http://monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/HG/HG20/HG_XX_
Summary.pdf (also see the accompanying press release Monopolkommission,
Pressemitteilung,
9
July
2014,
http://tinyurl.com/h94daez);
Monopolkommission, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Kartellverstößen,
Sondergutachten 72 (2015), http://monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/
SG/s72_volltext.pdf; see already Monopolkommission, Stärkung des
Wettbewerbs bei Handel und Dienstleistungen, XIX. Hauptgutachten 2010/11
(2012) § 479 (calling for research into the question of criminalisation).
13 On whistleblowing rewards see also A. Stephan, Is the Korean Innovation
of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool? (January
15, 2014), CCP Working Paper 14–3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405933; E.
Bueren, Prämien für Whistleblower im Kartellrechtsvollzug (2012) Zeitschrift
für Wettbewerbsrecht 310–48.
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8. Professor Andreas Stephan of the Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia addresses the
assumption, made by many in the criminalisation debate,
that public opinion in Europe does not consider antitrust
infringements as sufficiently worthy of moral condemnation to justify criminal sanctions.14 The question is
an empirical one, and Professor Stephan has addressed
it in the way empirical questions should be approached:
by looking at the evidence. He reports on large-scale
surveys on public attitudes to antitrust infringements
in the UK, Germany, Italy, and the US.15 As Professor
Stephan explains, the results of the survey will not settle
the debate once and for all: the data are conducive to
cherry-picking. Proponents of criminalisation can now
point to evidence that in the UK, the US, in Germany
a majority of respondents considered price fixing as
equally serious as fraud, and as equally or more serious
than insider trading; that an overwhelming majority
in all jurisdictions considered it more serious than illegally downloading music; and that a strong minority
of respondents (some 45%) considered cartels at least
as serious as tax evasion. One can also reject the notion
that the public attitude to white-collar crime in the US is
somehow “unique”; Professor Stephan draws attention
to the surprising uniformity of the responses from the US
and from the European clusters. Opponents of criminalisation will likely argue that when directly asked whether
imprisonment would be an appropriate sanction for price
fixers, support in Europe hovers between one quarter and
one third of respondents. However, Professor Stephan
explains that there may have been a response bias because
of uncertainty whether “imprisonment” referred to a
prison sentence (that could possibly be suspended) or to
actual incarceration (which could be considered excessive
in a jurisdiction where most first-time nonviolent offenders only get suspended prison sentences). Indeed, such a
response bias appears likely, given that otherwise it would
be difficult to explain how a majority in most of the jurisdictions can equate the seriousness of price fixing with
fraud, but reject imprisonment as a possible sanction —
unless this was understood as a popular vote to decriminalise fraud. With regard to attitudes in the UK, the new
survey in combination with an earlier survey conducted in

14 This is emphasised in particular by opponents of criminalisation. See, e.g.,
Ost, n. 6, 134; M Dreher ‘Wider die Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts’
(2011) Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 232, 237.
15 The full survey results are reported in A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes
to Price Fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA, CCP Working Papers
15–8, http://tinyurl.com/zlbwnrh.
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the UK16 also allows some longitudinal insight: support
for the sanction of imprisonment appears to have tripled
in the UK between the first and the second survey.

II. Status quo
9. With regard to the status quo, the experience with
criminal enforcement in the United Kingdom and
Ireland—often touted as the European jurisdictions with
criminal enforcement—is limited and fairly well publicised, and I will only briefly mention it below.
10. In contrast, the state of the “law in action” in continental European Member States on individual sanctions is much less transparent.17 There are at least four
reasons for this intransparency regarding individual,
and in particular criminal enforcement on the continent.
First, there are language barriers: to the extent there is a
detailed discussion, the discourse takes mostly place in
the local language (French, German, Italian, Spanish,
Polish, etc.). International observers usually rely on
brief English-language summaries in multi-jurisdictional
surveys that may or may not capture accurately the law in
action.18 Secondly, while the competition law community
in the UK has predominantly accepted the arguments

16 A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel
Enforcement in Britain (May 1, 2007), (2008) 5(1) Company Law Review
123–45, http://ssrn.com/abstract=993407.
17 According to the country reports in A. N. Campbell (ed.), Getting the Deal
Through: Cartel Regulation, 2015, 15th edn, at least the following EU
jurisdictions provide for criminal sanctions for cartels (or, where noted, only
bid rigging): Austria (bid rigging, see A. Ablasser-Neuhuber and F. Neumayr,
ibid., 17, 19); Belgium (B. Lebrun and L. Bersou, ibid, 23, 25: “Bid rigging
is the sole cartel activity which is likely to lead to criminal sanctions”); the
Czech Republic (T. Fiala, ibid., 63, 65); Denmark (since 2013; A. RungHansen, ibid., 69, 71); France (see the contribution by David Viros in this
issue); Germany (bid rigging; see below, Professor Zimmer’s contribution
in this issue, and Wagner-von Papp, What if all Bid Riggers Went to Prison
and Nobody Noticed? Criminal Antitrust Law Enforcement in Germany in
C. Beaton Wells and A. Ezrachi [eds.], Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies
of an International Regulatory Movement (Oxford: Hart 2011) 157); Greece
(see A. Papadopoulos and L. Lovdahl Gormsen, in Campbell, 104, 107);
Hungary (bid rigging; L. Szabó, ibid., 117, 120); Ireland (P. Andrews and
D. Collins, ibid, 135, 137–8; for more detail see P. Massey and J. D. Cooke,
Competition Offences in Ireland: The Regime and Its Results, in Beaton-Wells
and Ezrachi, 105; T. Calvani and K. M. Carl, The Competition Act 2002, Ten
Years Later: Lessons from the Irish Experience of Prosecuting Cartels as
Criminal Offences, [2013] 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 296), ; Italy (R.
Caiazzo and F. Costantini, in Campbell, 150, 154); Poland (bid rigging only,
D. Hansberry-Bieguńska and M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, ibid, 212, 214);
Romania (separate provisions for cartels and bid rigging, M. Rădulescu and V.
Iacob, ibid, 227, 229); Slovenia (N. Pipan Nahtigal and T. Lahovnik, ibid, 245,
247–8); UK (for the amended cartel offence, see A. Stephan, The UK Cartel
Offence: A Purposive Interpretation [2014] 12 Criminal Law Review 879;
P. Gilbert, Changes to the UK Cartel Offence—Be Careful What You Wish for
[2015] 6 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 192; for the 2002
version, see idem, The UK Cartel Offence: Lame Duck or Black Mamba,
Centre for Competition Policy [CCP] Working Paper No. 08-19, http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1310683; J. Joshua, DOA: Can the UK Cartel Offence be
Resuscitated, in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, 129). This does not even include
criminal sanctions for procedural offences, such as in Cyprus. Finland, and
Sweden (and in the EFTA Switzerland) considered, but eventually rejected
criminalisation. The Netherlands considered re-criminalising cartels, but
eventually decided against it (M. J. Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law:
Principles and Practice [Oxford: Hart 2014] 222–4). In the EEA, Norway has
also criminal sanctions (T. Sando and A. J. Hageler, in Campbell, 206, 208).
To be sure, in many of these jurisdictions the criminal cartel provisions are
law in the books without enforcement. Yet even this law in the books may
become relevant when it comes to extradition, see below, § 40.
18 See the country surveys in Campbell, n. 17.
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scope of substantive infringements or the evidentiary
standards applied. He emphasises the need for transparency, both in the political discussion preceding the
introduction of criminal sanctions and in the application of these sanctions. He highlights the importance of
patient institution building, in particular for cooperation
between competition authorities and prosecuting authorities where they are not one and the same. A further
important aspect highlighted by Professor Kovacic is the
building of support for criminalisation in the population
and judiciary. This last point leads up to the contribution
by Professor Andreas Stephan.

1. Looking at enforcement
numbers
11. Let us first look at the enforcement numbers—
bearing in mind that numbers indicate activity, not necessarily effectiveness of enforcement.21
12. David Viros reports that in France there have been
approximately two criminal convictions per year under
Article L. 420-6 of the French Commercial Code over
the first two decades of the provision’s existence.22 While
most of these convictions resulted in fines or suspended
prison sentences, at least five defendants were actually
incarcerated for periods up to one year, starting as early
as 1995.23 To put this into perspective: this actual incarceration took place more than a decade earlier than the
suspended prison sentence in the 2006 heating oil cartel

19 See Ost, n. 6, 133–4; P. Klocker and K. Ost, Nach der Novelle ist vor der
Novelle—Themen einer 8. GWB-Novelle, in Brinker (ed.), Recht und
Wettbewerb, Festschrift Bechtold (Munich: CH Beck 2006) 229, 240–2;
Dreher, n. 14; A. Bräunig Wider die Strafbarkeit von “Hardcore Kartellen”
de lege ferenda, (2011) HRRS 425, https://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/
archiv/11-10/index.php?sz=11. These repeat and build on the objections
that had been raised by competition lawyers in earlier times, when it was
mainly criminal lawyers that argued for criminalisation. See, e.g., W. Kartte
and A. von Portatius, Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts? (1975) BetriebsBerater 1169–72; W. Möschel, Zur Problematik einer Kriminalisierung von
Submissionsabsprachen (Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1980).
20 Ost, n. 6, 134; Klocker and Ost, n. 19, 244 (suggesting that it may be
preferable to abolish individual liability and apply administrative procedure
to fines imposed on the undertaking, similar to the procedure in the EU
Courts; such a procedure would, however, arguably not be consistent with the
guarantees in the German Constitution).
21 See W. E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance, 16 George Mason Law Review 903; idem and D. A. Hyman,
Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize? (December
19, 2015), forthcoming in Washington Law Review, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2705919.
22 See David Viros’s contribution below, §§ 13, 14. See also L. Idot,
Conference—Criminal and competition laws: Comparative study of antitrust
criminal provisions and policies in European Member States, February 2008,
Concurrences Review No. 1-2008, Art. No. 15196, www.concurrences.com.
23 D. Viros, below, §§ 13, 14. The convictions concerned multiple (antitrust and
other) offences, ibid, § 12.

in Ireland, which is widely touted as the “first successful
criminal prosecution of a hard core cartel in the EU,”24 and
“the first prison sentence in Europe.”25
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for the criminalisation of cartels since the Penrose report
and the subsequent introduction of the cartel offence in
2002, enthusiasm for criminal enforcement has generally been muted on the Continent.19 Even administrative (or quasi-criminal) enforcement against individuals
is not uncontroversial.20 This lukewarm response also
has an impact on the interest in research of the status
quo—competition law experts are generally happy to
leave criminal enforcement to criminal law experts, and
criminal law experts rarely tend to devote their attention to competition matters. Thirdly, the intransparency
is owed to difficulties in accessing information on the
sanctions imposed on individuals. Higher privacy standards on the Continent prohibit naming and shaming in
the press, and access to criminal or quasi-criminal decisions is restricted. The fourth reason is that in continental
jurisdictions, criminal enforcement is usually decentralised: it is public prosecutors with local or regional jurisdiction that investigate and prosecute these cases.

13. In Germany (as in a number of other Member
States26), “only” bid rigging is a criminal offence (§ 298
of the German Criminal Code).27 Other cartel infringements, including price fixing, market allocation, or
output restrictions, are mere administrative offences
that may result in administrative fines both for individuals and undertakings. Even with this limited scope
of the criminal offence, there were 264 prosecutions,
184 convictions, and 26 suspended prison sentences in the
period from 1998 to 2008 (inclusive).28 In his contribution to this issue, Professor Zimmer updates these statistics through to 2012 by adding that in 2009, 19 convictions were reported (three of which were suspended
prison sentences, one for six months, one for more than
9 but no more than 12 months, and one for more than
one year but no more than two years); in 2010, 17 convictions were reported (one of which was a suspended prison
sentence of more than one but no more than two years);
in 2011, 20 convictions were reported (seven of which
were suspended prison sentences, four of which were for
sentences of more than one but no more than two years);
and in 2012, 22 convictions were reported (all fines).29
In addition, in 2013, the latest year for which officially
reported data are available, 35 convictions were reported,
of which five defendants were sentenced to suspended
prison sentences.30

In Germany, the highest actual prison
sentence to be served being two years and
10 months
14. Altogether, this brings the number of criminal
convictions in Germany reported in the official statistics
for bid rigging between 1998 to 2013 (inclusive) to 297

24 P. K. Gorecki and D. McFadden, Criminal Cartels in Ireland: the Heating Oil
case (2006) European Competition Law Review 631, 640.
25 B. A; Barnett, Criminalization of Cartel Conduct—The Changing
Landscape, Adelaide, Australia (3 April 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
criminalization-cartel-conduct-changing-landscape. The Irish Competition
and Consumer Protection Commission’s website makes the much more
modest claim that these were the first jury convictions for price fixing in
Europe, which is probably accurate given the nearly complete absence of
juries in continental Europe.
26 E.g., Austria, Hungary, Poland, and apparently Belgium; references in n. 17.
As David Viros points out in his contribution, the restrictive conditions of the
more general provision Article L. 420-6 will de facto mostly be fulfilled in
bid-rigging cases.
27 See D. Zimmer’s contribution below, § 1; F. Wagner-von Papp, What if
all Bid Riggers Went to Prison and Nobody Noticed? Criminal Antitrust
Law Enforcement in Germany, in C Beaton-Wells and A Ezrachi (eds.),
Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory
Movement (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011) 157, 164–82.
28 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 166–8 (explaining that these statistics are
underreporting actual enforcement), 182 (statistics on prosecutions,
convictions and sentences between 1998 and 2008, inclusive).
29 See the contribution by Daniel Zimmer, § 5, and the statistics from
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3 for the respective years.
30 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2013 (Wiesbaden 2015) 172.
Two of the suspended prison sentences were to six-month prison each, and
three were for periods of between 9 and 12 months.
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In the beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals
were fined a total of approximately
€3.6 million
15. In addition to criminal enforcement for bid rigging,
German competition authorities have prosecutorial
discretion to impose administrative fines on individuals under § 81 of the German Act against Restraints of
Competition. For individuals, the statutory maximum
fine is €1 million. Again it is difficult to get at reliable
statistics about the actual practice of setting the fine:
the Bundeskartellamt, curiously, chooses not to report
systematically the amount of the individual fines
imposed. Nevertheless, it is possible to give some indication of the “law in action.” In a case before the German
Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundeskartellamt
submitted that in the period from 1993 to 2010 it had
fined 510 individuals and 563 legal persons for competition law infringements—approximately one individual per legal person.36 The average fine per fined individual in that period was reported to be €56,000.37 It should
be noted that this average includes not only horizontal

31 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 166–7.
32 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 168–70. The 2005 conviction was mostly for
corruption offences and only partly for aiding and abetting bid rigging
(sentence of two years and six months; BGH, 22 June 2004, 4 StR 428/03,
49 BGHSt 201), but the 2006 conviction and sentencing to two years and ten
months in the District Heating Pipes cartel was for bid rigging (under the
bid-rigging offence and concurrently aggravated fraud; LG Munich II, 3 May
2006, W5 KLs 567 Js 30966/04, BeckRS 2008, 00736).
33 BGH, 29 April 2015, 1 StR 235/14, BeckRS 2015, 12466.
34 Sentences of more than two years cannot be suspended. § 56(2) of the
German Criminal Code (StGB).
35 Ost, n. 6, reports that “at a recent meeting of public prosecutors (…) with
a special competence for prosecuting bid-rigging, not one of them could
remember any conviction including the imposition of a custodial sanction.”
With respect, given that they overlooked the three cases in which I know there
to have been custodial sentences (excluding all the suspended sentences), this
seems to speak more to the level of intransparency in German law than to
the existence or non-existence of further cases. An error-detection mechanism
that detects zero out of three known errors does not give great confidence in
its reliability.
36 BVerfG, 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 18/11, WuW/E DE-R 3766, §§ 52,
60 – Verzinsungspflicht, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
ls20121219_1bvl001811.html (in German).
37 Ibid., § 60.
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cartel cases, and that the maximum fine was doubled
from €500,000 to €1 million in 2005 without retrospective
effect, so that most of the fines in the sample will have
been based on the lower maximum. There are some indications that in larger cartel cases, typical individual fines
are in the order of magnitude of €200,000 to €250,000.
For example, in the beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals
were fined a total of approximately €3.6 million.38 Even if
this amount were uniformly distributed among all these
14 individuals, the fine for each of these 14 individuals
would be approximately €257,000. Since a skewed distribution seems more probable, the highest fine is likely to
have been higher—possibly substantially higher—than
that. Similarly, individual fines of €250,000 and €200,000
were reported in the Wholesale Paper39 and Cement40
cases, respectively. However, the quantification of the fine
depends on multiple factors, among others the wealth
and income of the person fined.41 Accordingly, individual fines even in cartel cases can be substantially lower
than the previous numbers suggest.42
16. It should be pointed out that in Germany these individual administrative fine appear to be magnitudes higher
than the usual individual criminal fines that are imposed
in the officially reported bid-rigging cases.43 However, this
may be due to the under-inclusivity of the official statistics that arguably exclude the more serious bid-rigging
cases; in the District Heating Pipes cartel, in addition to
the 2-year-10-month prison sentence described above, the
court imposed criminal a fine of €100,000 on the main
defendant.
17. France and Germany are not alone among the continental jurisdictions in imposing prison sentences. In
Austria, for example, courts have imposed not only
suspended sentences,44 but also prison sentences that
were not (entirely) suspended.45

38 Bundeskartellamt, 2 April 2014, Fallbericht Bußgelder gegen Brauereien
(Summary Case Report on the decisions of 27 December 2013 and 31 March
2014, Case B10-105/11), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidung/DE/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2014/B10-105-11.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
39 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792, WuW/E DE-R 2225,
§ 10 — Papiergroßhandel (Wholesale Paper).
40 In the Cement case, the individual fine of €200,000 imposed on the individual
“Ed. Sch.” was reduced by 5 per cent (€10,000) on appeal because of the
long duration of the appeal procedure, BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12,
WuW/E DE-R 3861, §§ 1, 87–91 — Grauzement (Cement).
41 Second sentence of § 17(3) of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
42 E.g., in the Cement case, the lowest of the fines for nine individual appellants
was only €6,000, BGH, n. 40. In another cartel case, the Higher Regional
Court Düsseldorf set a fine of some €40,000 for one of the individuals, OLG
Düsseldorf, 29 May 2015, V-2 Kart 1+2/13 (OWi), NRWEntscheidungen. For
a discussion of the factors influencing the setting of the individual fines in
an information exchange case, see OLG Düsseldorf, 29 October 2012, V-1
Kart 1–6/12 (OWi) §§ 140–96, NRWEntscheidungen — Silostellgebühren.
43 See Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 168 in fn. 75.
44 E.g., OGH, 26 January 2001, 13 Os 34/01, http://tinyurl.com/h5czaj4.
45 OGH, 6 October 2004, 13 Os 135/03, http://tinyurl.com/jypmnvs (where one
defendant, D. I. Dietrich B., was sentenced to a prison sentence of two years,
of which 18 months were suspended, resulting in a six-month incarceration).

Concurrences N° 2-2016 I On Topic I Individual sanctions for competition law infringements: Pros, cons and challenges

Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.

convictions, with 42 suspended prison sentences and the
remainder criminal fines. I have pointed out elsewhere
that these cases reported in the official statistics systematically under-report the more serious cases.31 Because of
this bias, the official statistics so far do not report any
actual cases of incarceration, so that one has to rely on
anecdotal evidence. In 2005 and 2006, two persons were
actually incarcerated, the highest actual prison sentence
to be served being two years and 10 months.32 In 2015,
the German Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal
of two defendants who had been convicted of bid rigging
(concurrently with corruption charges) and sentenced to
one-and-a-half years and two years and four months,
respectively.33 At least the latter prison sentence cannot
be suspended.34 Whether these three cases are the only
ones in which defendants “served time” or whether they
are the tip of the iceberg is impossible to say.35

2. Institutions
19. So, in terms of mere numbers Germany and France
have more criminal enforcement than the UK and
Ireland. However, effective deterrence is not a function
of enforcement numbers as such. Numbers must not
obscure that current criminal competition law enforcement in Germany and France is not always institutionally well embedded in the overall antitrust system, and
fails to achieve its deterrent potential.

46 A. Hammond and R. Penrose, Proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK
(November 2001), Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT365)
47 R v. Whittle, Allison and Brammar [2015] EWCA Crim 2560, [2009]
UKCLR 247.
48 Office of Fair Trading, Project Condor Board Review, http://tinyurl.com/
hdug9am.
49 Competition and Markets Authority, Director Sentenced to Six Months
for Criminal Cartel, Press Release 14 September 2015, https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/director-sentenced-to-6-months-for-criminal-cartel.
In sentencing, the judge indicated that a two-year sentence would generally
be an appropriate sanction, but that this was to be reduced because of the
substantial cooperation of the defendant.
50 Competition
and
Markets
Authority,
CMA
statement
following
completion
of
criminal
cartel
prosecution,
Press
Release
24
June
2015,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
cma-statement-following-completion-of-criminal-cartel-prosecution.
51 These new defences present their own problems; see A Stephan, Purposive
Interpretation, n. 17; Gilbert, n. 17.
52 See the references for Ireland in n. 17, and the information on the
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission’s website, http://ccpc.
ie/enforcement-mergers-enforcement-mergers-criminal-enforcement-cartels/
criminal-court-cases.

20. To be sure, both France and Germany have made an
attempt to integrate criminal enforcement with competition law enforcement. The Autorité can refer cases to the
public prosecutor;53 so can the Bundeskartellamt (and the
competition authorities in the German Länder). French
courts can ask for the Autorité’s opinion.54 German law
has made sure that the competition authorities retain
their jurisdiction for dealing with the undertakings even
where individuals are criminally prosecuted by public
prosecutors,55 and that public prosecutors and competition authorities keep each other informed about their
investigations under § 298 StGB.56
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18. The French and German experience should be considered against the backdrop of the enforcement numbers
for the cartel offence in the United Kingdom. A lot of
effort went into the drafting of the original cartel offence
in s. 188 Enterprise Act 2002, and approximately six to
ten prosecutions per year had been expected to result.46
Actual enforcement famously lagged behind expectations. There were, first, the three guilty pleas in the
Marine Hose cartel, facilitated by the Damocles sword
of the US plea bargain, that eventually resulted in prison
sentences of 20, 24 and 30 months.47 Then there was the
Fuel Surcharges cartel prosecution that failed on the first
day of trial for procedural reasons.48 More recently, one
person pleaded guilty in the Galvanised Steel Tank cartel
case and was sentenced to a suspended sentence of six
months’ imprisonment,49 while two defendants who did
not plead guilty and went to trial were acquitted, because
the jury did not find that they acted “dishonestly.”50 In the
meantime, the Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act 2013
(“ERRA 2013”) has removed the dishonesty requirement
(and replaced it with a range of defences, in particular
previous publication or notification to the CMA51), so
that this acquittal need not be indicative for the success
of future prosecutions. In Ireland, there have been many
more criminal convictions than in the UK, though not as
many as in Germany. However, the vast majority ended
in relatively low fines and a few suspended sentences.52

21. Three main failures can, however, be identified in
both Germany and France: decentralised enforcement
by general prosecutors and criminal courts; the failure
to make the most of cooperation between competition
authorities and prosecutors or courts; and the failure to
provide for automatic immunity for successful leniency
applicants. Tax law is generally more effective on all three
counts.

Criminal enforcement is largely confined to
local or regional prosecutors and courts
22. First, in France and Germany (and many other continental jurisdictions), criminal enforcement is largely
confined to local or regional prosecutors and courts.
David Viros notes that this decentralised enforcement
differs from the treatment of “serious tax or securities fraud which is prosecuted by a national, specialized public prosecutor.”57 In Germany, the call for such
a national specialised public prosecutor for serious
economic crimes has been raised for decades. Economic
crime is sometimes concentrated in the so-called
Schwerpunktstaatsanwaltschaften, but these are still relatively decentralised and arguably do not often deal with
competition law. This decentralised enforcement by
general public prosecutors results in a lack of competition-law specific knowledge and experience, as well as
in a lack of publicity: while the Bundeskartellamt press
releases are invariably picked up by the national press,
reports of criminal enforcement is often confined to
local court reporting (if there is any coverage at all). For
the rest of the world—including potential infringers,
whose deterrence is after all the whole point of criminal
enforcement—the level of enforcement and sanctions in
these jurisdictions remains obscure. Because of the relatively low numbers of criminal competition law cases for
each of the decentralised enforcers, the decentralisation
arguably also leads to a distortion in the prioritisation of
prosecutions. On the one hand, a local prosecutor who

53 Contribution by David Viros below, §§ 23, 24.
54 Ibid., §§ 21–22. See also ibid. §§ 15–20 for other interactions of administrative
and criminal enforcement in France.
55 § 82 GWB.
56 RiStBV No. 242, which seems to be honoured more in the breach than in the
observance. The Bundeskartellamt has invited prosecutors for an exchange of
experiences since 2012 (see Bundeskartellamt, Press Releases of 10 February
2012, 15 April 2013, and 3 June 2014).
57 Contribution by David Viros below, § 12.
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There has up to now been very little
involvement of the competition authorities
in the actual prosecution
23. Second, the jurisdiction of general public prosecutors would perhaps be much less problematic if competition authorities were actively involved with the criminal
proceedings, provided subject-matter expertise, and
publicised statistical information. Despite some level of
involvement of the competition authorities with criminal
cases,58 there has up to now been very little involvement
of the competition authorities in the actual prosecution
in France or Germany. Again it is tax law that shows that
things can be different. In Germany, the tax authorities
have concurrent jurisdiction with the public prosecutor
for investigating criminal tax avoidance.59 Even where
it is the prosecutor that investigates and prosecutes, the
tax authorities have extensive information and participation rights.60 The German literature has long asked for a
similar degree of involvement for competition authorities
in criminal competition cases.61

Great care has to be taken that these
individual sanctions do not interfere with
the effectiveness of leniency programmes
24. Third, and most pressingly, the protection of leniency
programmes is paramount for the effectiveness of
public competition law enforcement. There are excellent reasons, both moral and utilitarian, for increasing
the emphasis on individual and criminal sanctions. Great
care has to be taken, however, that these individual sanctions do not interfere with the effectiveness of leniency
programmes. Where individuals fear they might go to

58 Above § 20 (note in particular the possibility in France since 2014 for the
judge to involve the Autorité).
59 §§ 386, 399 Federal Tax Code (Abgabenordnung [AO]).
60 §§ 402, 403, 406, 407 AO.
61 Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 175, with further references to, inter alia, J. Biermann,
Neubestimmung des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts
(2007) Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 1, 43; B. Federmann, Kriminalstrafen
im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006) 518–20. See also R. Raum,
§ 82a, in H.-J. Bunte (ed.) Langen/Bunte Kartellrecht Kommentar Vol. 1 12th
edn (Wolters Kluwer 2014) § 3 (noting that § 82a GWB, which allows the
court in the administrative fines procedures to permit the competition authority
to direct questions to the accused, witnesses and expert witnesses, falls short
of § 407 AO, and is, at any rate, inapplicable to criminal prosecutions;
considering this to be a legislative mistake that should be corrected).
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prison (even if in reality the probability for a cooperating defendant to go to prison in Europe currently tends
toward zero), and perhaps even if they fear high pecuniary individual sanctions, they may be deterred from
self-reporting their conduct. It is important, therefore,
that there is automatic immunity at least for the successful immunity applicant. The importance of guaranteeing automatic immunity from criminal prosecution has
been demonstrated by the much greater effectiveness of
the 1993 immunity programme in the US compared to
the previous programme that had offered discretionary
rebates.
25. Unfortunately, neither France nor Germany have
provided for automatic immunity for successful leniency
applicants in their criminal competition provisions.
Viros discusses this issue for France, and notes that the
Autorité will not refer cases to the public prosecutor
where a leniency application has been made. This does
not, however, prevent the public prosecutor from initiating an investigation on its own accord. The proposal to
introduce an individual leniency programme providing
for immunity has not yet been accepted.
26. In Germany, the bid-rigging provision provides for
immunity only where the perpetrator prevents the bid
from being accepted or has at least expended best efforts
to prevent acceptance where the bid is not accepted for
other reasons (§ 298[3] StGB). The general leniency provision for helping to uncover a crime (§ 46b StGB) does not
apply to crimes without minimum prison sentences, and
so does not apply to the bid-rigging provision; even if it
did apply, it would only result in a discretionary reduction of the sentence. In the legislative discussion of § 46b
StGB, however, the government explained that where the
accused was guilty of a crime without a minimum prison
sentence, the prosecutor or court were likely to close the
case against a perpetrator that contributed substantially
to the uncovering of the crime anyway. This is arguably
true in practice: especially given the aversion prosecutors and courts have against dealing with complex
economic crime, it seems very unlikely indeed that a
successful leniency applicant would ever be prosecuted
and convicted. However, what counts for the decision to
reveal a cartel, especially where risk-averse decision-makers are concerned, is not what actually happens, but the
expectation of what might happen. In the absence of an
automatic immunity provision, the possibility of criminal
prosecution may deter individuals from applying for
leniency or contributing to their undertaking’s leniency
application.
27. Yet again, it is tax law that shows that there are no
conceptual obstacles to providing for automatic criminal
immunity for perpetrators that self-report.62
28. The recommendations for more effective criminal
competition law enforcement, then, would be to establish a dedicated, centralised prosecutor; that the competition authorities should be involved in the investigation

62 § 371 AO.
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gets a small bid-rigging case that is easily provable may
prosecute where a centralised prosecutor might prioritise
a more harmful infringement even if it is slightly more
difficult to prove. On the other hand, a general prosecutor may understandably prioritise cases with more
salient harm, such as a confidence trickster that defrauds
a few individuals, over cartel cases where the aggregate
harm may be magnitudes greater but the victims are less
readily identifiable. A specialised prosecuting authority
has an incentive to prove its worth by bringing cases, and
bringing the right cases. Similarly, it should be considered whether court jurisdiction could be concentrated
with courts with competition law experience.

29. On these dimensions, the UK has mostly done better
than France or Germany. The CMA and SFO have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute, results are widely
publicised, and the no-action letter provides sufficient
ex ante certainty. The failed Fuel Surcharges prosecution demonstrated that perhaps a close involvement of
a public prosecutor with expertise on the criminal procedure element of the prosecution may still be desirable.
In the US, the Department of Justice’s subject-matter
expertise and prosecution experience provides for the
optimal combination, but one that is arguably not realistically duplicable in Europe in the short or medium term.
30. It is perhaps not a coincidence that tax law provides
the template for effective criminal enforcement without
impairing the regulatory objectives: here, the state has
“skin in the game.” Honi soit qui mal y pense.

III. Cartel
criminalisation
31. The arguments for criminal competition law enforcement beyond the confines of the German bid-rigging
offence or the narrow conditions of the French provision in Article L. 420-6 of the French Commercial Code
have been discussed for several decades now, and have
been systematically introduced into the European debate
by Professor Wouter Wils.63 First, deterrence by relying
exclusively on fining undertakings will not be effective,
not only because these fines cannot be raised to optimal
levels due to legal and practical (insolvency) constraints,
but also because fines against the principal will not necessarily deter the agent.64 Second, where there is automatic immunity for leniency applicants, criminal sanctions provide a strong incentive to be first in reporting

63 W. P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008) §§ 544–634; see already W. P. J. Wils, Does
the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require not only Fines on
Undertakings, but also Individual Penalties, and in particular Imprisonment?,
in C. D. Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing 2003) 411–52. Of course similar arguments had been made
previously in national discourses, usually with a less economic and more
legal approach (in Germany, see, e.g., K. Tiedemann, Kartellrechtsverstöße
und Strafrecht [Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1976]; idem, Welche
strafrechtlichen Mittel empfehlen sich für eine wirksamere Bekämpfung der
Wirtschaftskriminalität, in Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages
[ed.], Verhandlungen des neunundvierzigsten Deutschen Juristentages
Vol. 1 Part C [Munich: C. H. Beck 1972]; see also, though arguing against
criminalisation, W. Möschel, Zur Problematik einer Kriminalisierung von
Submissionsabsprachen [Cologne: Carl Heymanns 1980] with further
references) and in particular in the US (e.g., G. J. Werden and M. J. Simon,
Why Price-Fixers Should Go to Prison, [1987] 32 Antitrust Bulletin 917).
However, Wils’s contributions have undoubtedly had the effect of focusing
the pan-European discussion on the issue.
64 Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 547–59.

the cartel.65 Third, criminal enforcement is a uniquely
effective deterrent and sends a strong moral message.66
Professor Zimmer, in his contribution below, expands on
these arguments, as did the Monopolies Commission in
its recent reports.67
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and prosecution with full participation rights; that results
should be widely publicised (for privacy reasons: usually
on an anonymised basis); and that there should be an
automatic immunity provision.

32. Opponents of criminalisation raise objections that
fall into two broad categories. First, they doubt that
competition law infringements are sufficiently “immoral”
to justify criminal enforcement (the moral argument).
Second, they fear that criminal enforcement could
endanger the effectiveness of the existing enforcement
mechanisms (the utilitarian argument).

Are competition law infringements
sufficiently “immoral” to justify criminal
enforcement?
33. With regard to the moral argument, opponents of
criminalisation generally acknowledge the large social
harm that cartels cause, but argue that part of the
decision to criminalise behaviour should be whether
there is a sufficient recognition in the population that the
conduct in question deserves the level of moral opprobrium required to employ criminal law, the remedy of last
resort.68 They postulate that popular opinion would not
support criminalisation.69
34. This argument rests on two fragile pillars: that
popular recognition of conduct as criminal is a necessary condition for criminalising the conduct, and that
popular opinion would not support criminalisation.
The argument breaks down if one of the pillars falls.
35. Regarding the first pillar, if one were to reduce
criminal law to those prohibitions on which lay persons
spontaneously agree in a state of nature, that is, without
the guiding posts of what others consider worthy of
criminal sanctions, one would end up with a very short
list. In many cases, it takes the legislator to take the first
step by criminalising conduct to send a signal that certain
conduct is considered worthy of condemnation.70
36. Regarding the second pillar, I have to admit that my
intuition also used to be that popular opinion still does not
sufficiently recognise the social harmfulness of cartels.71
The study on which Professor Stephan reports in this
issue is informative in this regard in two ways. First, even

65 Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 560–5.
66 Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 566–74.
67 Above n. 12.
68 M. Dreher Wider die Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts (2011) Wirtschaft
und Wettbewerb 232, 237.
69 Ibid.
70 Baumann and Arzt, Kartellrecht und allgemeines Strafrecht (1970) 134
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 24, 30, 32;
Wagner-von Papp, Kriminalisierung von Kartellen (2010) Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb 268, 274 (with reference to the first survey in the UK, see n. 16);
see also M. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust (2006) Columbia Business Law
Review 443, 489 et seq; Wils, Efficiency and Justice, n. 63, §§ 572–4.
71 Wagner-von Papp, n. 70, 274.
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37. David Viros rightly emphasises that criminal sanctions for antitrust infringements are nothing new in
Europe, either. He points to Article 419 of the Napoleonic Criminal Code of 1810. Similarly, in Germany one
could point to the Prussian royal decree of 14 July 1797,76
Article 335 of the Bavarian Criminal Code of 1813, and
§ 270 of the Prussian Criminal Code of 1851, all of
which concerned bid rigging, and were comparable to
Article 412 of the Napoleonic Criminal Code of 1810.77
It does not appear that these early provisions were vigorously enforced, but they may indicate that the immorality

72 Stephan, n. 1, 9.
73 On this point see P. Whelan, Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of
“Moral Wrongfulness” (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 535, 550–5.
74 For the argument under German law that a positive statement (possibly in
standard terms) that there was no price fixing could constitute fraud (§ 263
StGB), and that one could even consider fraud charges when the “contracting
parties take it for granted that neither of them infringes the Act against
Restraints of Competition,” see Baumann and Arzt, n. 70, 35; for essentially
the same argument in the UK for the common law offence of conspiracy to
defraud, see J. Lever and J. Pike, Cartel Agreements, Criminal Conspiracy
and the Statutory “Cartel Offence” (2005) European Competition Law
Review 90, 95, and the discussion in Ian Norris v. Government of the United
States & Ors [2008] UKHL 16 [59]–[62] (holding that at least in the 1990s
there was no sufficient consensus that secret price fixing in itself would be
enough to find conspiracy to defraud, because there was no implied promise
that the price was reached independently, but making a possible exception
where “aggravating features” were present, arguably referring to additional
dishonesty such as “lying to potential purchasers about the existence of the
agreement,” ibid. [51]).
75 For a more elaborate justification of the legitimacy of criminalisation, see
A. Stephan, Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of Cartel
Law, (2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 333, 336–44.
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of anticompetitive conduct is not, as is sometimes
claimed, a “US import” that has no support in European
culture: the 1797 decree stated in the preamble that the
mischief of bid-rigging agreements was their “immoral
and illegal selfishness.”
38. From a utilitarian perspective, the reasons for criminalisation seem overwhelming—but one has to proceed
with great caution in the implementation. Whether criminalisation is desirable depends very much on the institutions in each jurisdiction. Where, for example, it is impossible to allow for criminal immunity, competition law
should not be criminalised, lest leniency programmes be
undermined. For Germany, at least, this is simply not the
case: while constitutional arguments against immunity
provisions have often been made, they have not succeeded
in the courts, and the immunity from criminal enforcement for criminal tax avoidance in § 371 AO clearly
shows that where there is a will, there is a way. In any
case, the already existing criminal rules in the Member
States (regardless whether they are general, as in France,
or limited to bid rigging, as in Germany) already require
this particular issue to be resolved. Similar considerations go for the other existing institutional deficiencies noted above.78 The European Union should lend a
helping hand in “Regulation 2” that would overcome any
remaining constitutional concerns in the Member States.

May criminalisation lead to over
deterrence?
39. Another argument against criminalisation is that
it may lead to overdeterrence. To the extent the cartel
offence is narrowly drafted to catch only horizontal
hardcore cartels, this is arguably a negligible problem.
One could still be apprehensive about some chilling
effects on legitimate cooperation. Here, the possibility to exclude criminal liability where the arrangement
was notified to the competition authority (along the
lines of the revised cartel offence in the UK79) should be
considered.
40. What is more: arguments against criminalisation
largely ignore the international dimension. At least to the
extent a cartel affects import commerce into the US (or
fulfils the FTAIA conditions), there already is criminal
liability for Europeans.80 While this criminal liability in
the US may have been a footnote in earlier times, today
all potential cartelists should better factor the possibility of extradition into their calculation.81 The case of the
Italian alleged member of the Marine Hose cartel that
was extradited from Germany to the US signals a new

76 Decree of 14 July 1797 against various abuses in judicial and other public
subhastations and auctions, reprinted in Carl Ludwig Heinrich Rabe (ed.),
Sammlung Preußischer Gesetze und Verordnungen, Vol. IV (Halle and
Berlin 1817), 204.

78 Above §§ 21–28.

77 See Wagner-von Papp, n. 27, 160–6, for a brief summary in English of
the historical development of criminal sanctions in Germany from these
early times to the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, the post-war Allied
decartelisation laws, the Act against Restraints of Competition 1958, the
practice of criminal courts since 1992 to classify certain forms of bid rigging
as criminal fraud, and the eventual introduction of the bid-rigging offence in
§ 298 of the German Criminal Code.

80 United States v. Nippon Paper, 109 F3d 1 (1st Cir 1997); United States v.
Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837, 192
L. Ed. 2d 875 (2015).

79 Here, I only refer to the notification to the competition authority; most of
the other defences present issues that would better have been avoided. See
Stephan, Purposive Interpretation, and Gilbert, both n. 17.

81 P. Girardet, “What if Uncle Sam Wants You?”: Principles and Recent Practice
Concerning US Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases, (2010) 1 Journal of
European Competition Law & Practice 286; see also A. Stephan, n. 75, 353.

Concurrences N° 2-2016 I On Topic I Individual sanctions for competition law infringements: Pros, cons and challenges

Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.

lay people seem to consider price fixing as akin to fraud.
Second, about two thirds of the European respondents to
the survey expect that when they buy a product or service,
the price has been set independently.72 This is important
both in terms of morality and with regard to positive
law. With regard to morality, it supports the argument
that price fixing violates the norm against deception.73
With regard to positive law, the reason why price fixing
has not been qualified as fraud in Germany, or a conspiracy to defraud in the UK, is that courts found that in
the past there was no tacit implied promise that prices
are formed independently.74 Tacit assumptions today are
different from times in which prices in Europe were often
subject to price control. Although it would not be desirable to apply the general fraud provisions to competition
cases—because the general criminal law institutions for
these provisions are not tailored to the requirements of
competition law—, the very thin doctrinal line between
fraud provisions and price fixing (and other hardcore
horizontal cartels) should amply demonstrate that from
a moral perspective there is hardly any difference, if any
at all.75

41. A more problematic aspect of multi-jurisdictional
criminal enforcement is the complexity it creates for
leniency programmes. In the single-jurisdictional context,
it is relatively easy to conceive an immunity rule for the
successful leniency applicant which reinforces rather
than impedes the leniency programme. Things become
much more difficult if conduct leads to criminal liability in several jurisdictions and a leniency applicant is not
certain to be the first in all these jurisdictions. Two solutions to resolve this problem appear possible from a theoretical perspective. First, immunity provisions could let it
suffice that the leniency applicant was first in any jurisdiction (or at least any EU or EEA jurisdiction). This,
of course, could lead to gaming the system: all cartelists
could avoid criminal liability by coordinating such that
each of them is first in one jurisdiction. The second
solution appears overdue in any case: to come up with
an international clearing agency for leniency applications. On the level of the EU or EEA, such a clearing
agency appears necessary anyway, given the malleable
criteria for case allocation within the European Competition Network.83

IV. Conclusion
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era.82 Travelling even within Europe has become perilous
for anyone who participates or participated in a cartel
affecting the US. The US has negotiated extradition
treaties with many countries over the last two decades.
While these extradition treaties require double criminality, this criterion is fulfilled whenever there is “law in the
books” in the Member State in question. Through this
backdoor, even the largely or completely unenforced
criminal provisions in some Member States can result in
cartelists being ordered to “[g]o directly to Jail. Do not
pass Go. Do not collect $200.”

42. Criminal competition law enforcement is possible and
desirable. However, great care has to be taken in its implementation. Criminal immunity must be provided for in
order to protect leniency programmes. In the multi-jurisdictional context, the EU should provide both for a
clearing agency for leniency applications, and for a prohibition of individual sanctions for those who applied
successfully for immunity under leniency programmes via
the clearing agency. Institutionally, competition authorities should be well integrated into criminal investigations and prosecutions. The prosecutions should preferably be centralised with a dedicated prosecutor instead of
the decentralised local enforcement we currently see in
Germany and France. Prosecutions should be well publicised; this does not require that the names of the prosecuted individuals are made public where privacy concerns
prevail. However, deterrence can only work if sanctions
are not only imposed, but also seen to be imposed. n

82 For the decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court rejecting the
alleged cartelist’s constitutional challenge, see BVerfG, 17 February 2014,
2 BvQ 4/14, WuW/E 4275—Auslieferung wegen Kartellverstoßes. For an
analysis in English, see M Röhrig, Nowhere to Hide? Extradition in Antitrust
Cases from a European Perspective, 6 Journal of European Competition Law
& Practice 168–76.
83 See, for some of the issues that may arise under the current system of
independent leniency programmes, CJEU, 20.01.2016, DHL Express
(Italy) v AGCM, case C-428/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:27. But see Competition
and Markets Authority, Response to the European Commission’s Public
Consultation on ‘Empowering the National Competition Authorities to be
More Effective Enforcers’ (10 February 2016) §§ 45–51 (suggesting that
national solutions are sufficient and that other states should copy the criminal
immunity approach that the UK uses, but largely disregarding the crossjurisdictional effects in a network of national solutions).
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1. There is a growing insistence, amongst scholars, practitioners or lawmakers interested or involved in competition policy and enforcement, on the need to complement corporate fines with fines on individuals, in order
to increase deterrence and align the interests of staff and
management with those of shareholders, the latter bearing
in practice the brunt of the corporate fine. This call was
made only recently by the European Parliament in its resolution on the Annual report on EU Competition Policy.1
However, such demands oftentimes are made together with
a critical appraisal of the growing level of corporate fines.2
2. There is a wide array of systems within the EEA foreseeing individual sanctions for antitrust infringements: while
17 Member States foresee only criminal sanctions and 5
only administrative sanctions, 3 comprise a mix of criminal
and administrative sanctions, with the remaining 4 including no provisions within their legal framework on individual
antitrust sanctions.3 Interestingly, the landscape of individual sanctions in the EEA is the reverse image of the situation as regards corporate fines, with only 4 Member States
in which a criminal or quasi-criminal system is in place.
3. The French legal system reflects the binary distinction
criminal/individual vs. administrative/corporate, which
holds sway in a majority of Member States. This contribution aims to account for the specificities, borne out
of history, experience and necessity, which bring nonetheless to the French criminal system of enforcement its
unique features.

1 European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2016 on the Annual report
on EU Competition Policy: “29. Considers that the existing rules on fines
to be imposed on legal persons for infringements must be supplemented by
concomitant penalties against the natural persons responsible; takes the
view that the fines should be high enough to act as a deterrent; emphasises
the importance of a successful whistleblower policy, which has allowed the
Commission to detect cartels.”
2 See, for example, Ian Forrester’s intervention at the Bundeskartellamt’s
17th International Conference on Competition mentioned in
“Le Bundeskartellamt organise sa 17ème conférence internationale à Berlin
et rassemble la communauté de la concurrence pour faire un état des lieux
des convergences et divergences sur les sujets brûlants”, D.V., Concurrences
No. 2-2015. The European Parliament’s above-mentioned resolution may also
implicitly allude to the level of corporate fines: “30. Regards legal certainty as
crucial, and calls on the Commission to incorporate the rules on fines, such as
those imposed in cartel proceedings, into a legislative instrument.”
3 Source: ECN, February 2014. Figures only account for custodial and pecuniary
sanctions. Disqualification orders, in particular, are not taken into account.
Specific criminal sanctions only applicable to bid-rigging practices are, for the
purpose of this estimate, counted as criminal antitrust sanctions.
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4. The first provisions foreseeing the sanction of antitrust
infringements under French law were criminal in nature
and hail back to 1810 and Napoleonic rule. Article 419
of the former Criminal Code thus provided that he “who,
by reunion or coalition amongst the main holders of a
same merchandise or good, seeks not to sell it, or only at
a certain price” or “who, by whichever fraudulent means
or ways, brings the price of goods or merchandise upwards
or downwards (…) above or below the prices which natural
competition and free trade would have determined,” is
liable to a maximum of one year imprisonment and ten
thousand francs in penalty. The wording was partially
revised in 1926, the maximum custodial sentence was
extended to two years and the maximum fine increased,
but these provisions essentially remained the same for
176 years, until 1986, when the independent, administrative, enforcement of competition law was established.
5. In conjunction with these provisions, separate antitrust
prohibitions, likewise on a criminal law basis, were introduced in the period following the Second World War.
Two executive orders (ordonnances) of 30 June 1945,
initially adopted to deflect looming inflation and manage
shortages, were subsequently amended by a decree of 9
August 1953 and a law of 2 July 1963, which introduced
cartel (the 1945 executive order was initially restricted
to price cartels) and abuse of dominance prohibitions
under French law. These prohibitions mirror to a significant extent the wording of current antitrust prohibitions
foreseen under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.
6. This system of criminal antitrust enforcement relied
on the determination of the liability of the individual infringer, management or staff, and the imposition
of sanctions thereupon, for which the undertaking was
held jointly and severally liable.4 This criminal model was
in force in a context, post-war France, in which centralized economic planning by the State was prevalent and
took precedence over the implementation of fledgling

4 Article 56 of Executive Order 45-1484 of 30 June 1945.
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Individual criminal sanctions
in France

7. However, lawmakers did not forgo in 1986 the possibility to sanction individuals but circumscribed instead
the remit of criminal antitrust law to them. Accordingly,
administrative and criminal enforcement have coexisted
ever since, in relation respectively to legal persons, on the
one hand, and natural persons on the other.7

I. Individual criminal
sanctions: Article
L. 420-6 of the
Commercial Code
8. Pursuant to Article L. 420-6 of the Commercial Code,
“If any natural person fraudulently takes a personal and
decisive part in the conception, organization or implementation of the practices referred to in Articles L. 420-1 and
L. 420-2 [anti-competitive practices], this shall be punished
by an imprisonment of four years and a fine of 75,000 euros.”
9. From the outset, it must be noted that besides the existence of an anti-competitive practice,8 three cumulative
elements must be proven to incur a criminal sanction,
whether pecuniary or custodial. The involvement of the
individual concerned must be (i) personal in the accomplishment of the competition infringement, as well as (ii)
decisive and (iii) fraudulent.

5 See The role of competition Policy in regulatory reform – Regulatory reform
in France, OECD, 2004. By way of illustration, the commission technique des
ententes et positions dominantes, advisory body set up to provide expertise
and support to the Minister of Economics in matters relating to antitrust law
and the institutional predecessor of the current French competition authority,
issued 133 opinions on cases from 1953 to 1977, 23 of which led to a
transmission to the Public Prosecutor with ultimately 8 convictions (figures
quoted in Inflation, État et opinion en France de 1948 à 1952, M.-P. Chélini).
6 Executive Order (ordonnance) 86-1243 of 1 December 1986
7 Article 54 of Law No. 2004-204 of 9 March 2004 (“loi Perben”) eschewed the
so-called “speciality principle” which restricted corporate criminal liability to
offences which explicitly provided for the liability of legal persons. As a consequence,
pursuant to Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code, this entails that undertakings were
liable in the same manner as individuals for all crimes and offences from 1 January
2006. A doctrinal debate is ongoing as to whether this can be extended to criminal
antitrust violations under Article L. 420-6 of the Code of Commerce, which
explicitly refers to a “natural person” (“personne physique”), and the consequence,
should this be the case, in relation to the application of the ne bis in idem principle.
8 In the absence of reference to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and seeing as
criminal prohibitions must be strictly interpreted, pursuant to Article 111-4
of the Criminal Code, the criminal sanctions set out under Article L. 420-6
do not apply to 101/102 infringements, with limited practical consequences
inasmuch as the substantive requirements of Articles L. 420-1 and L. 420-2
are aligned with their EU counterparts.

10. The involvement is personal if the individual takes part
in person in the series of acts, or part thereof (meetings,
exchange of information, etc.), that are the material
support of the antitrust infringement. The offence is thus
linked to the person who materially participates in the
infringement rather than to the person who is the legal
representative or exerts strategic or operational control
over the concerned activity, if she or he is different.9
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instruments of competition enforcement.5 A marked
shift was witnessed in the late 1970s with the passing of
important legislative reforms bolstering the profile of
the renamed Commission de la concurrence, culminating in 1986 with the creation of the Conseil de la concurrence6, immediate predecessor to the present Autorité de
la concurrence. The targets of enforcement have henceforth been undertakings and legal persons, through the
imposition of administrative fines and injunctions.

11. The involvement must also be decisive, thus limiting
the scope of the offence to the individuals who are active
in the infringement, not only by their presence, but also
because of the role they played when initiating or actually
organizing the infringement. This does not preclude
holding a plurality of persons, within a single undertaking, responsible should they each have played a decisive
role, respectively, as regards the conception, the organization and the implementation of the practice.
12. Finally, the fraudulent intent requirement adds to
the burden of proof by seemingly requiring that the individual, not only took a deliberate and conscious part in
the infringement, but also manifested, in his actions, a
bad faith element through deceptive means or attempts
at concealment. This sets the bar high for a finding of
misdemeanour under Article L. 420-6 and explains why
convictions so far have been mostly limited to bid-rigging cases, with Article L. 420-6 convictions oftentimes
combining counts of misuse of company assets, corruption or favouritism.10 This somewhat ancillary nature
of criminal antitrust convictions is also reflected in its
decentralized enforcement: prosecution is carried out at
the district level, before the territorially competent court,
as opposed to serious tax or securities fraud which is
prosecuted by a national, specialized public prosecutor.
13. Since its entry into force, convictions under Article
L. 420-6 have remained scarce, albeit not insignificant.
Based on available figures regarding the first two decades
of enforcement of Article L. 420-6,11 an average of

9 This clear intention of ascribing criminal liability to the individual who took a
direct and material part in the infringement is apparent in the Report drafted
by the Working Group presided by Jean Donnedieu de Vabres, then Head of
the Commission de la concurrence, which submitted to the Government a
draft text which greatly inspired the 1986 Ordonnance : “Il y aurait poursuite
pénale de nature délictuelle à l’égard de la personne physique qui ʻaurait
pris une part déterminante dans la conception, l’organisation, la mise en
œuvre ou le contrôle de telles pratiques’ en agissant ʻpar contrainte, abus
d’autorité, dissimulation ou tout autre moyen frauduleux’. On aboutit ainsi à
une délimitation plus précise des domaines pénal et non pénal. L’article 56
de l’ordonnance no 45-1484 du 30 juin 1945 créant en matière économique
une responsabilité pénale du commettant ne serait pas repris. Ne pourrait
être déféré devant le tribunal correctionnel que celui qui est responsable de
son propre fait.”
10 E.g., Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation (hereafter, “Crim.
Chamber”), 16 May 2001, 97-80888 99-83467: the defendant, sitting at the
committee reviewing the bids and holding an electoral mandate at the local,
contracting, authority, was charged and convicted of “passive” corruption,
embezzlement, breach of trust, fraudulent participation in a cartel as well as of
being an accessory to misuse of company assets. See, for further information
on the interplay between anti-corruption and antitrust enforcement, the French
contribution to the OECD Global Forum on Competition of February 2014:
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/fev14_corruption_uk.pdf.
11 Source : Internal figures, Autorité de la concurrence ; Les poursuites
pénales contre les auteurs de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, Concurrences
No. 2-2006, E. David.
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14. A case in point is the Ile-de-France high-school
bid-rigging cartel, which involved 14 undertakings implementing for 7 years a concerted and organized effort to
allocate amongst themselves 88 public works tenders
launched by the Ile-de-France region to renovate public
schools. The contracts amounted to a total of 10 billion
French francs (circa €1.5 billion). This wide-spread bid
rigging was encouraged by officials of the contracting
authority, as part of a kickback scheme, and facilitated
by the assistant to the contracting authority, itself chosen
by the said authority in order to facilitate the implementation of the cartel and kickback effort. On appeal, convictions for 11 offenders were upheld, with fines in the range
of €10,000 to €120,000 and 6 prison sentences ranging
from 10 month suspended term to 3 years, of which 2
were suspended. The French competition authority fined
the undertakings involved a total of €47.3 million for
their liability under Article L. 420-1 of the Commercial
Code, a sum which reflected the cap on fines as it was set
at the time of the practices13.

II. Interplay between
administrative and
criminal proceedings
15. The prosecution of criminal antitrust infringements
resides fully within the remit of the public prosecutor.
The Autorité de la concurrence cannot launch, investigate
nor sanction violations of Article L. 420-6. Conversely,
the Autorité de la concurrence is fully responsible for the
launch, investigation and sanction of infringements to
Articles L. 420-1 and L. 420-2 and their EU Law equivalent. However, this clear dividing line between administrative and criminal enforcement does not exclude some
level of interplay and mutually reinforcing cooperation.
16. Firstly, the rules governing limitation periods and
their interruption reflect a continuum between criminal
and administrative proceedings as part of a broader
public enforcement. Thus, investigatory action by the
Autorité de la concurrence will interrupt the running of
the limitation period applicable to criminal proceedings,

12 Crim. Chamber, 9 November 1995, 94-84204; Tribunal correctionnel (first
instance court), 13 novembre 1997, Asphalt mix case; Crim. Chamber, 16 May
2001, 99-83467 97-80888; Tribunal correctionnel, 30 June 1999, Grenoble
regional hospital case; Crim. Chamber, 20 February 2008, 02-82676
07-82110.
13 Five pour cent national turnover in the last full year prior to the decision.
As of 16 May 2001, this cap was increased to 10% of the highest worldwide
yearly group turnover from amongst the accounting years between the year
prior to the inception of the infringement and the year prior to the infringement
decision.
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as foreseen by Article L. 420-6, paragraph 3. Conversely,
investigatory action by the public prosecutor in respect
of an infringement to Article L. 420-6 will interrupt the
running of the limitation period applicable to administrative proceedings: the Civil Chamber of the Cour
de cassation grounded this solution on the fact that the
material element of a violation of Article L. 420-6 rests
in part on the finding of a violation of Article L. 420-1,
to which Article L. 420-6 refers; this commonality in the
object of investigations pursued by the public prosecutor and the Autorité results in the actions of the former
interrupting the limitation period applicable to proceedings before the latter. This solution is now enshrined in
Article L. 462-7. Together, these rules on the interruption
of the limitation period safeguard the effectiveness of the
reciprocal means by which the Autorité and the authorities charged with criminal enforcement refer cases and
files to one another (see below). This holds particularly
true when the Autorité refers a case to the public prosecutor, as such a referral is made concurrently with the
adoption of the infringement decision, therefore at the
very end of the administrative proceedings.
the very end of the administrative proceedings.

The public prosecutor or the investigating
judge may give the Autorité access
to the criminal investigation file
17. Secondly, the public prosecutor or the investigating
judge may give the Autorité access to the criminal investigation file so as to substantiate the latter’s own proceedings regarding similar facts. Article L. 463-5 of the
Commercial Code reads: “Investigating and decision-making courts can disclose to the Autorité de la concurrence,
at its request, the minutes, the investigation reports or any
other documents relative to the criminal proceedings which
have a direct link to the facts under assessment by the
Autorité.” Such communication interrupts time limits.14
18. The Autorité is entitled to use this evidence to find an
infringement, as long as all the parties are given access
to the evidence communicated by the public prosecutor or the investigative judge, during the course of the
administrative proceedings, and thus allowed to dispute
its content and the conditions under which they were
obtained.15
19. Pursuant to article L. 463-5, the Autorité requested
several times the disclosure of criminal evidence, which
subsequently served as evidence to find an administrative
infringement. Indeed, five decisions of the Autorité in the
last ten years relied in part on criminal evidence: Road
public works in the Seine-Maritime department16 (2005),

14 Commercial Chamber of the Cour de cassation, 15 January 2008, 07-11.677
07-12.132 07-12.357.
15 Crim. Chamber, 13 October 2009, 08-17269 08-17476 08-17484 08-17616
08-17622 08-17640 08-17641 08-17642 08-17669 08-17772 08-17773
08-21132.
16 Decision 05-D-69 of 15 December 2005.
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two cases per year have led to pecuniary and/or custodial sentences, the latter consisting, for the most part,
in suspended prison terms. In five instances, convicted
offenders were actually jailed, serving up to one-year
sentences.12

20. The investigatory powers of the investigative judge
exceed those of the Autorité’s agents: the evidence thus
communicated can present the Autorité with some “smoking
guns” it would not have been in a capacity to obtain otherwise. These powers include in particular the interception,
recording and transcription of telecommunication correspondence, unbeknownst to those involved (Article 100 to
100-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the aforementioned Monument restoration case, the Autorité, as per
Article L. 463-5, obtained from the prosecutor hearings,
seized documents and transcripts of telephone recordings,
collected in the context of criminal proceedings initiated
before the Rouen Criminal Court against the directors of a
number of building firms for having participated in cartels
involving the restoration of historic monuments. The
content of wiretaps accounted significantly for the establishment of the impugned practices and the imposition, by
the Autorité, of an overall fine of nearly €10 million.

The investigative judge may request the assistance
of an agent of the Autorité by letter rogatory,
in order to conduct criminal investigations
21. Thirdly, the investigative judge may request the assistance of an agent of the Autorité by letter rogatory, in
order to conduct criminal investigations, pursuant to
Article L. 450-1-IIbis of the Commercial Code, introduced by a Law of 19 March 2014. The investigative “firepower” of the Autorité may thus support and increase the
application of Article L. 420-6, while the judge’s prerogatives in directing the investigation and referring the case
to the criminal court for judgment remain intact. Two
requests have been lodged to date, for which assistance is
currently being provided.
22. Fourthly, the criminal judge can request the Autorité’s
opinion in a given case, pursuant to Article L. 462-3,
which opens to any court, whether civil, administrative
or criminal, this possibility, provided the question relates
to the application of Article L. 420-1 and/or L. 420-2.
As mentioned above, the violation of Article L. 420-1
and/or L. 420-2 being one of the material elements of a
finding pursuant to Article L. 420-6, the criminal judge
is thus entitled to seek the Autorité’s opinion. It remains
to be seen whether the possibility now offered to the
investigative judge to request the Autorité’s assistance in
the investigation will diminish the incentives to seek the
Autorité’s formal opinion on the matter (in particular as
regards requests for opinion issued by the investigative
judge himself, which he has standing to do21).

Cooperation goes both ways and
the Autorité may take the initiative
to communicate, on its own motion,
its case-file to the public prosecutor
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public procurement in the Ile-de-France region17 (2006),
High schools in the Ile-de-France region18 (2007), Road
signs (2010)19 and Monument restoration (2011).20

23. Finally, cooperation goes both ways and the Autorité
may take the initiative to communicate, on its own motion,
its case-file to the public prosecutor when it considers
that the facts at hand warrant an Article L.420-6 investigation. This action interrupts the limitation period for
prosecuting the said practices.
24. This provision has been applied moderately, with
10 cases sent to the public prosecutor’s office since 1994,
although there has been a definite increase since 2000,
mostly in relation to bid-rigging cases for public procurements. After transmission of the file, the outcome of the
criminal procedure very much depends on the public
prosecutor concerned, in whose hands lies the power to
prosecute the infringement.
25. The adoption of the Autorité’s first leniency notice
in 2006 and the significant contribution of the leniency
programme towards the attainment of the objectives of
effective and deterrent enforcement, with 10 cartel decisions issued so far on the basis of one or several leniency
applications for a total of circa €3 billion in fines, have
made it necessary to acknowledge the need to maintain
incentives to apply for leniency, when considering transmitting a case-file to the public prosecutor. The Autorité
has thus publicly stated, in its leniency notice, that it
considers that the existence of a leniency application is a
legitimate reason for abstaining to communicate the file
to the public prosecutor.
26. In January 2008, an official report, known as
the Rapport Coulon, after the presiding member of
the commission, a former president of the Paris Court of
Appeal,22 was submitted to the Minister of Justice. Its main
aim was to reflect on corporate offences and introduce
greater consistency, where needed, between criminal and
administrative offences in the area of company, distribution and consumer law. The report suggested introducing
a leniency system for individuals, in the form of a certification by the public prosecutor of the leniency application submitted to the Autorité. This recommendation
is echoed, several years after, by the European Commission’s focus, in the context of its recent public consultation on the “empowerment of national competition authorities” as well as in its Communication on the ten years of
Regulation 1/2003,23 on the issue of the interplay between
leniency programmes and sanctions on individuals. n

22 La dépénalisation de la vie des affaires, Rapport au Garde des Sceaux,
ministre de la Justice, janvier 2008.
17 Decision 06-D-07 of 21 mars 2006.
18 Decision 07-D-15 of 9 May 2007.

23 Communication from the Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (COM(2014)
453, 9.7.2014).

19 Decision 10-D-39 of 22 December 2010.
20 Decision 11-D-02 of 26 January 2011.
21 E.g., Opinion 99-A-20 of 23 November 1999.
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I. Introduction
1. The optimal design of competition law enforcement
by authorities and private parties currently constitutes a focal point in the legal and political discussion
of competition law in Germany. The conception of the
official system of sanctioning, especially under the law
of regulatory offences, is the subject of broad discussion in Germany, and encompasses problems of constitutional law and procedural law,1 as well as aspects of
corporate liability.2 One issue to come up in recent years
in the discussion on an effective system of sanctions is
whether it is in the interest of an improved cartel enforcement to criminalise other hard-core violations besides
bid rigging which is a criminal offence (Sec. 298 of the
German Criminal Code). Similar debate has taken place
before in Germany, at the time of the enactment of the
Act against Restraints of Competition, but also in the
1970s and 1980s, although the discussion did not find
its way into the statutes.3 Current impetus for considera-

* The presentation is based on the Chapter “Kriminalisierung
von Kartellrechtsverstößen in Deutschland” in the Twentieth Biennial
Report 2012/2013 by the German Monopolies Commission (published in
2014). A more extended version has been presented at the Conference, The
Fight against Hard Core Cartels: Trends, Challenges and Best International
Practices, in November 2014 in Madrid. Many thanks go to Ms. Alison Felmy
for translating the text.
1 Cf. Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decision of 26 February 2013, Case No.
KRB 20/12 — Grauzementkartell.
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tions on extending the criminalisation of competition law
violations comes for the most part from the US, where
such violations are traditionally prosecuted not only in
civil court but also under criminal law, as well as from
certain EU Member States that have recently introduced
criminal sanctions in this area.4 The OECD has also
repeatedly dealt with this topic in recent years.5
2. The discussion on extending the criminalisation of
competition law violations focuses on the criminal
enforcement of so-called hard-core cartels, that is, horizontal price, output and territorial cartels. The German
Monopolies Commission considers a restriction of
possible legislative measures to hard-core cartels to be
appropriate and—for constitutional reasons—necessary. For one thing, it is generally agreed that such cartels
cause particularly severe damage, which is why they are
prohibited in all competition law regimes of the EU
Member States, in the law of the European Union and in
many other legal systems. Secondly, the threat of criminal
sanction exclusively for horizontal hard-core cartels
precludes the risk of over-regulation. If one affirms the
potential of criminal penalties to have a higher deterrent effect, the risk could arise that those in charge of
a company would refrain even from behaviour that is
legal and competitively efficient simply for fear of criminal-law consequences. Such a risk is particularly high
when the delimitation of legal and illegal conduct is difficult. We can assume this to be true in the area of vertical
agreements, but also with unilateral conduct in the area
of abuse control. The same kind of difficulties do not,
however, arise with horizontal price, output and territorial cartels. In this respect, there are no legal grey zones;

2 In this respect, the law on regulatory offences was developed further in the
eighth amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition, which
entered into force in June of 2013. The future conception of the procedure for
competition law fines was also a topic of discussion for the Working Group on
Competition Law of the Bundeskartellamt in the year 2012: Bundeskartellamt,
Hintergrundpapier zur Tagung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 4. Oktober
2012, Kartellbußgeldverfahren zwischen deutschem Systemdenken und
europäischer Konvergenz.

4 Criminal penalties were introduced e.g. in Ireland and the UK; there are
also tendencies toward decriminalisation, however, e.g. in Austria and the
Netherlands.

3 Cf. M. Dreher, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2011, p. 232 et seq. n. 11 with
further references.

5 OECD, Policy Roundtables 2003 Cartel Sanctions against Individuals, DAF/
COMP(2004)39, 10 January 2005.
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Individual sanctions in
German competition law:
The case for a criminalisation
of antitrust offences?*

II. Competition Law
enforcement practice:
Administrative fines
and criminal statistics
3. In recent years, the fines imposed by the Bundeskartellamt have increased drastically. Since 2007, each
year’s total has continually amounted to more than
€180 million, and in some years the total has been far
higher. According to the authority’s own statistics, the
fines for the years 2012 to 2014 have steadily increased.
In 2014, the total exceeded the sum of €1 billion.6
4. The Bundeskartellamt does not publish detailed statistical information on the number of cartel cases prosecuted
or the decisions issued that involve fines. The most recent
reports on its activities do, however, provide insights on
a number of significant cartel cases and the individual
decisions issued regarding undertakings, associations of
undertakings and natural persons. The report for 20112012 alone includes 19 cartel cases of great significance
and over 220 decisions on fines.7
5. The criminal statistics concerning Sec. 298 of the
Criminal Code (bid rigging) have presented considerable
numbers of cases for the past several years. In the period
from 2003 to 2012, these show that between 42 and 230
cases were handled each year. In the years 2011 and 2012
there were 53 and 115 cases noted, respectively. These
statistics include all violations registered with the police,
however; not in every case was there a charge brought
by the public prosecutor, or main proceedings instituted
by the court, much less a conviction. We can therefore
obtain a better impression from the numbers provided by
the Federal Statistics Office, which inform us that in the
years from 2008 to 2012 there were 20, 19, 17, 20 and 22
convictions made.8 A prison sentence was issued in five
cases in 2008, three cases in 2009, one case in 2010 and
in seven cases in 2011; in the year 2012 only fines were
issued.9

6 http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/DE/WIWO_
Rekordjahr.html.
7 Bundeskartellamt, Report of Activities 2011-2012, BT-Drs. 17/13675, p. 30 f.
8 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2008, p. 70, 2009, p. 70,
2010, p. 72, 2011, p. 70 and 2012, p. 72. Wagner-von Papp points out that in
the statistics, a case with unity and plurality of acts is listed only under the
act incurring the highest punishment: F. Wagner-von Papp, Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb 2009, p. 1236 et seq., 1243 and n. 51.
9 Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3, 2008, p. 102, 2009, p. 102,
2010, p. 106, 2011, p. 102 and 2012, p. 106.

III. Sufficient
deterrent effect
of the current system
of sanctioning?
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rather, hard-core cartels generally paint a clear picture in
terms of illegality. Limiting the criminal prosecution to
especially severe competition-law violations would have
the additional advantage of avoiding extensive economic
balancing tests in the course of a criminal procedure.

6. A central question in the discussion of farther-reaching criminalisation of competition law violations—
going beyond the specific constellation of bid rigging—
is whether the deterrent effect that the existing official
and private possibilities of sanctions have on companies and natural persons is strong enough. The threat
and the imposition of sanctions are intended to create
incentives to act in a manner in conformity with competition law. Current members of a cartel are supposed to be
kept from carrying on with the cartel, potential members
kept from forming new ones. An indication that such
prevention is not sufficient could be seen—albeit on the
surface—in the increased numbers of cases and fines.
Such an argument would be short-sighted, however, for
it fails to consider that the legal conditions for combating
cartels have changed drastically in the last few years, and
the competition authorities have greatly intensified their
activities in this area.
7. As regards the high number of cases, a factor that
deserves particular mention is the introduction of the
“Bonus Rule” by the Bundeskartellamt in the year 2000,
which was amended and expanded in 2006. According to
the authority, this rule played a central role in the detection of cartel violations, both directly and indirectly.
In enforcing the cases on which it receives direct notification, the Bundeskartellamt often receives information
on further violations that would otherwise have gone
unnoticed. Another factor to be named in this context
is the introduction in June 2012 of an informant system
that facilitates the anonymous reporting of cartel violations. Furthermore, one can observe that the competition authorities in recent years have focused their activity
on the prosecution of cartels, a policy that is reflected in
the very formation of three divisions of the Bundeskartellamt that have the sole task of prosecuting misconduct
in connection with violations of Sec. 1 GWB and Art.
101 TFEU. This shift of focus, in turn, is likely closely
connected with the introduction of the Bonus Rule and
the possibility of closing a case by settlement, which
makes the detection and quick prosecution of cartels
easier. It should not be ruled out, furthermore, that the
competition authorities exert their discretion under the
discretionary principle more frequently than they once
did in favour of taking up potential cartel cases. Finally,
it may be due in part to improved cooperation and reciprocal information in the network of European competition authorities that cartel violations have been prosecuted more often and with greater success.
8. Not only the basic conditions for governmental prosecution of competition law violations, but also the conditions for private enforcement of competition law have
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9. Although private compensation claims are still as a rule
follow-on claims of cartel victims who do not directly
contribute to the detection of competition law violations,
still the risk has recently grown that companies participating in cartels will be confronted with considerable
damages claims.12 This risk is especially great when the
damages are incurred not by the end consumer, but by
companies or other legal persons. It is true that orders
to pay damages have until now been the exception to the
rule.13 However, in some individual cases that ended in
settlements a considerable monetary compensation was
obtained.14 It is furthermore not out of the question
that damaged companies that continue to do business
with cartel members may obtain a certain compensation
within this framework, for instance in the form of future
rebates.
10. In addition to these measures, and due in part to the
intensified official and private enforcement of competition law violations in the recent past, awareness within
the companies of the issue of conduct contravening
competition law has undergone a change. The extent of
this change in awareness likely varies depending on sector

10 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States
and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance, OJ 2014 L 349/1.
11 On this see P. Stauber and H. Schaper, Die Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie
– Handlungsbedarf für den deutschen Gesetzgeber?, Neue Zeitschrift für
Kartellrecht 2014, 346 et seq.; see also e.g. H. Schweitzer, Die neue Richtlinie
für kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen, Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht
2014, 335 et seq.
12 Deutsche Bahn brings an action against rail cartel, Frankfurter Rundschau,
20
December
2012,
http://www.fr-online.de/wirtschaft/bahn-klagtgegen-ex-schienenkartell-um-thyssenkrupp,1472780,21154944.html;
Municipal transportation services file suit against rail cartel, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 21 February 2013, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
schienenkartell-zu-lasten-der-deutschen-bahn-kommunen-vor-klagegegen-schienenfreunde-1.1605741; Deutsche Bahn and 15 municipalities
file suit against escalator cartel, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
aufzugs-und-rolltreppen-kartell-wiederholungstaeter-thyssen-krupp-drohtmillionenzahlung-1.1540752; Commission goes to court over damages
suffered from elevators cartel, Press release of the European Commission,
IP/08/998 of 24 June 2008.
13 Mannheim District Court, decision of 4 May 2012, Case No. 7 O 463/11 Kart
– Feuerlöschfahrzeuge.
14 http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/thyssen128.html, as of 11 March 2014,
reporting that the Deutsche Bahn and ThyssenKrupp agreed to a settlement in
the rail cartel case in the amount of €150 million.
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and company. And yet, one must acknowledge that the
overall significance of compliance measures in companies has increased in recent years. Another area receiving
more and more attention concerns the possibilities and
duties of management and supervisory committees of
the company caught up in a cartel to raise claims against
employees who are responsible for cartel activities and
to enforce personnel consequences.15 Such measures that
directly impact the responsible party can develop a not
inconsiderable deterrent effect if they are applied consistently. It must be remembered, however, that this development is still in its fledgling stage.
11. The fact that both official and private cartel enforcement are currently undergoing changes makes it very
difficult to give a conclusive assessment of their deterrent
effect. It is possible that the existing system of sanctions
has not yet reached the full height of its preventive effect.
This is intensified by the fact that many of the cartels
detected and prosecuted in the past few years, such as the
hydrogen peroxide cartel or the escalator cartel, go back
to the beginning of the century, or as far as the 1990s.
However, in the opinion of the Monopolies Commission,
there are several reasons to believe that the current system
of sanctions is achieving only a meagre deterrent effect.

At what amount do these fines realise
a sufficient preventive effect?
12. When sanctions are threatened and imposed, the aim
is to deter current and potential participants in cartels.
Because, at least under the current system, the fines
threatened by law and imposed by authorities on companies stand at the centre of the penalisation of competition
law violations, one question is decisive: At what amount
do these fines realise a sufficient preventive effect?
13. According to the theory of optimal sanctions,
companies calculate a potential fine into their decision
of whether to act in conformity with or in contravention
of competition law.16 The gains of violating competition
law and the prospective costs of a violation are weighed
against each other considering the probability of being
penalised. In theory, determining the level of an effective fine is a matter of comparing values of expectation. A sufficient deterrent effect is only reached if the
fine equals at least the product of the expected profits
from the cartel and the inverse of the expected probability of discovery. For the probability that a cartel will be
detected there are estimates with results between under

15 H. Fleischer, Betriebs-Berater 2008, p. 1070 et seq.; C. Altemeier,
Verantwortlichkeit des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße: Ein Beitrag zur
Organhaftung und zur Organuntreue, Frankfurt, 2013; F.-J. Säcker, Wirtschaft
und Wettbewerb 2009, p. 3.
16 W. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust, University of Chicago Law
Review 50 1983, 652 et seq.
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been developed further in the last few years. With the
seventh amendment of the Act against Restraints of
Competition, such provisions were introduced as the
binding effect of competition agencies’ decisions on
damage compensation claims of third parties who
had suffered damages and the mandatory payment of
interest on damages. The Act’s eighth amendment led
to an expansion of the collective claims law, in that Sec.
33(2), No. 2, of the Act against Restraints of Competition now granted consumer collectives in particular the
right to claim an injunction as well as third-party profits
in cases of mass or scattered damages. The new Damages
Directive10 will signal only a slight need for adjustment,
as German law on the whole already is in line with the
Directive.11

14. Besides the fact that often the necessary data to calculate the optimal fine in a concrete cartel case are lacking,
the prospect of again drastically raising fines is confronted
with constitutional law concerns, among others, concerning such principles as proportionality.20 Furthermore,
a renewed increase of the fines imposed could lead in
particular to jeopardising the existence of those companies involved, which would have further social consequences on third parties, especially employees and creditors. The Bundeskartellamt and the European Commission could certainly take account of the economic performance of a company in the concrete individual case when
determining the level of the fine.21 And yet, if the Guidelines on fines were to announce that constrained economic
performance, or a risk to economic viability, would result
in a reduction of fines, this would simultaneously reduce
the deterrent effect of the threatened sanctions.
15. In addition, companies in the current system can
hope that dextrous maneuvering on their own part will
leave them fine-free or with a reduced fine, owing to the
Bonus Rule, if they should one day expose the cartel or
assist in its discovery.22 Therefore, the Bonus Rule cannot
be stripped of all credit in bringing cartels to light (and
prosecuting them). On the other hand, it contributes to
a reduction of the deterrent effect of regulatory sanctions, since adroit behaviour on the part of the cartel
offender can achieve a remission or reduction of the
fine.23 Such considerations will likewise be taken into
account by economically rational-thinking representatives of companies. Accordingly, the threat and imposition of deterring fines should, under the theory of the
optimal sanction, again be higher.

17 P. Bryant and E. Eckhard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught,
Review of Economics and Statistics 1991, p. 531 et seq. (13 to 17% probability
of detection). This estimate is based on the period of 1961-1988, however,
which is before the European Commission and the Bundeskartellamt
introduced leniency programmes; Wils therefore bases his calculation on a
rate of 33% and considers a sufficient deterrent effect as given only for fines
at or above 150% of the annual revenue generated by cartel products, W. Wils,
Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Law Enforcement, §§ 550 et seq.
18 Cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten XIX, Subsec. 476 with further
references.
19 Thus in the US fines of five times the amount of damages are under
discussion; cf. R. Lande, and J. Connor, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy:
Crime Pays, Cardozo Law Review 34, 427-490.
20 W. Möschel, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010, p. 869 et seq., who sees the
proportionality principle as already violated by the current amount of fines.

16. The deterrent effect may be significantly less on
natural persons. As explained already, the probability that cartel violations will be detected is, as far as we
currently know, around 30%. If we assume that as a rule
a good many natural persons participate in a cartel, and
yet the European Commission cannot impose a fine on
them, and the Bundeskartellamt only brings charges
against a portion of the natural persons responsible for
each cartel under the law on regulatory offences, the
probability of being charged is again much smaller than
in the case of punishing companies participating in a
cartel. Therefore the deterrent effect must also be considered to be even less. Under these circumstances it seems
quite questionable whether increasing the standard fines
from €500,000 to €1 million for severe cases, or from
€25,000 to €100,000 for minor competition offences in
the framework of the seventh amendment of the Act
against Restraints of Competition is enough to achieve
an effective deterrence.
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20 to 33%.17 According to a widespread belief, the current
level of fines therefore is not sufficient to deter all companies from entering into or continuing to participate in a
cartel.18 To do so, the fines—the probability of discovery
remaining the same—would have to be much higher than
those currently being imposed.19

17. The preventive effect of fines on natural persons is
furthermore doubtful when these can be sure to receive
a corresponding compensation from their employers.
Such compensation can be paid ex ante as well as ex post,
for instance when a higher salary or an additional bonus
is agreed upon before an authority discovers the cartel,
or when the employee is reimbursed in the amount of the
fine after a regulatory offence proceeding is conducted.
18. Certainly, the legal admissibility of such compensation payments is increasingly being called into question.
In this context, the discussion focuses on questions of
the social and criminal liability of those who arrange for
compensation to be paid out of company assets. Among
the measures being considered are damage compensation
claims on grounds of breach of obligations pursuant
to Sec. 93 of the Stock Corporation Act (AktG) or
criminal liability on grounds of breach of trust according to Sec. 266 of the Civil Code.24 A criminal liability
based on obstruction of punishment, on the other hand,
is normally out of the question because there is at least
presently no offence at hand—with the exception of bid
rigging—on which this could be based. Another point to
be made is that, at least when no direct compensation is
made subsequent to the fine, it will be difficult to prove
there was compensation.
19. Finally, the deterrent effect of individual fines would
fall to zero if the risk of actually having to pay a fine out
of one’s own pocket could be ruled out by means of an
insurance policy. As far as Directors and Officers (D&O)
insurance is concerned, however, we must assume that
an offender has no claim to compensation, at least when
deliberate conduct has been proven.

21 European Commission Guideline on the method of setting fines imposed
pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, op. cit., § 35;
Bundeskartellamt Guidelines for fines §§ 2, 16.
22 This idea also applies to the possibility of ending a proceeding by mutual
consent to a settlement agreement. But here the reduction of the fine is
limited to 10%, so the reduction of a deterrent effect should also be limited
as compared to the Bonus Rule; cf. press release of the Bundeskartellamt of
23 December 2013 on settlements.
23 K. Stockmann, Festschrift für Rainer Bechtold, 2006, p. 559, 567.

24 H. Fleischer, Betriebs-Berater 2008, p. 1070 et seq.; C. Altemeier,
Verantwortlichkeit des Vorstands für Kartellrechtsverstöße: Ein Beitrag zur
Organhaftung und zur Organuntreue, Frankfurt, 2013.
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20. The question of whether to extend the criminalisation of cartel violations constitutes an important aspect
in the current discussion in competition law and policy
on a system of adequate sanctions. In recent years, both
official and private enforcement have undergone, and still
are undergoing, far-reaching developments—in terms
not only of legal parameters but also of their application
in practice. This makes it difficult to estimate conclusively
how deterrent the current system of sanctions actually
is. Furthermore, it is possible that the latter has not yet
reached its highest point of deterrent effect. This assessment is supported by the fact that a number of cartels
that have been detected and prosecuted in the last few
years go back to the 1990s. The central question of the
appropriate level of deterrence, therefore, calls for further
investigation in the medium term.
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21. And yet there are several reasons to believe that the
deterrent effect of the current system of cartel sanctions should be augmented. If future analyses should
confirm this assessment, the Monopolies Commission deems it worthwhile to consider particularly such
measures with which incentives can be offered directly to
personally responsible employees of a company. In this
respect, a primarily criminal enforcement—going beyond
bid rigging—of hard-core cartels could be taken into
consideration. To increase the effectiveness of a possible
criminal punishment, flanking measures would be necessary; in particular, a criminal-law informant programme
for cartel participants should be created, and the position
of competition authorities in criminal proceedings
fortified.
22. Another sanction directly affecting the acting individuals and therefore leading to greater deterrence would
be an occupational ban, to be imposed by competition authorities. Besides this, the probability of detecting cartels could be increased by a regulatory reward for
informers. The introduction of corporate criminal law, in
contrast, is not a measure that the Monopolies Commission considers to be constructive, at least not in the area
of competition law. n
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I. Introduction
1. How should competition law punish offenders?
In 1890, the United States answered this vital query by
treating violations of the Sherman Act as crimes.1 Today
criminal enforcement against companies and individuals anchors the Department of Justice (DOJ) campaign
against cartels. The typical compliance talk on US law
recites a steep modern increase in fines collected and
prison terms served. For business officials around the
world, the grim warning is the same: Get caught in a
cartel that sells in America, and go to jail.
2. It is hardly inevitable that other competition systems—
more than 125 jurisdictions have competition laws, and
the number grows yearly—would emulate this feature
of the US regime. Other nations might recoil from what
they see to be another manifestation of an unhealthy
American obsession with incarceration to enforce laws.
Yet more than twenty jurisdictions have chosen to
denominate some or all antitrust offenses as crimes.2
Still others, concerned that even huge corporate fines
deter cartels inadequately, are debating whether to add
criminal sanctions.3
3. For actual and would-be adopters of criminal enforcement, the US program is an indispensable point of reference. This article uses US experience to illuminate the
institutional challenges that confront an antitrust regime

in going criminal. It takes no view on whether criminal
enforcement improves the quality of competition policy.4
Instead, it underscores the significant institutional consequences that criminal enforcement entails. Among other
tasks, criminal sanctions require a jurisdiction to:
– Develop an internal norm within the enforcement agencies that encourages employees to
treat certain acts as extremely grave offenses
worthy of aggressive investigation.
Persuade external constituencies—legislators,
– 
business officials, the bar, and the broader
society (including potential jurors)—to respect
an enforcement norm that deems certain antitrust violations to be worthy of criminal
condemnation.
Convince courts and juries that wrongdoers
– 
deserve conviction and severe punishment.
– Clearly delimit the category of offenses that
will elicit criminal prosecution to avoid the fact
or perception of unfair surprise in the application of the law.
– Accumulate evidence that provides a confident
basis for prosecution and conviction.
– Ensure that sanctions are sufficient to accomplish remedial and deterrence goals.

* Parts of this article are adapted from William E. Kovacic, Criminal
Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience,
in A. Ezrachi and C. Beaton-Wells (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical
Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2011). The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
1 15 USC §§ 1–2.
2 A partial list includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
3 K. J. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel and F. O. W. Vogelaar (eds.), Criminalization of
Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU
Member States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006).

4 The normative arguments raised in debates about the wisdom of criminalisation
of antitrust offenses are examined in W. P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in
European Antitrust Enforcement 155–201 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008).
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Comparative and historical perspectives—especially
awareness of how systems have evolved—provide rich
insights for institutional design. Perhaps most important,
the history of the US system indicates that the establishment of an effective criminal enforcement program for
competition law likely will be a slow, incremental growth.

5. This is hardly surprising. Criminal sanctions raise the
stakes in any body of law. As one leading scholar has
observed, criminalisation and similar major adjustments
in a legal system do not “occur in a vacuum.”6 Social and
political acceptance for robust criminal antitrust enforcement varies according to each country’s legal framework
and culture. It is unlikely to emerge automatically on the
day a criminal statute becomes law. Existing norms that
disfavour criminalisation of antitrust offenses may not be
immutable, but careful analysis of existing conditions is
essential to see what must be done to gain acceptance for
criminal punishment.7

9. The article begins by discussing how criminal enforcement affects the key elements of a competition law
system. The article then applies the concept of norms to
the implementation of a criminal enforcement program.
The final section uses US experience to suggest how an
enforcement program can gain acceptance for a norm that
treats certain conduct as worthy of criminal punishment.

Institutional mechanisms for applying
criminal sanctions likely will be difficult
to create
6. Even when a social consensus supports criminalisation, the institutional mechanisms for applying criminal
sanctions likely will be difficult to create. For example,
the US system vests criminal enforcement responsibility
in an executive ministry (DOJ), which has competence
to gather evidence and prosecute offenses. By contrast,
criminal antitrust enforcement in civil law systems often
requires cooperation between a civil administrative body
(the competition agency) and executive branch prosecutors. Effective collaboration between public institutions with shared duties seldom emerges smoothly and
spontaneously.
7. To set these and other vital foundations in place
requires careful deliberation in the law drafting process
and skilful management in the development of an
enforcement program. The difficulty of these challenges
has important implications for how a jurisdiction should
go about adopting criminal sanctions and for the expectations it should bring to this element of law reform.
8. This article uses US experience to identify major
implementation issues for criminal antitrust enforcement
and suggest how other jurisdictions might resolve them.

5 On the history of US experience with criminal enforcement, see D. I. Baker,
The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-Rigging, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 693; S. Hammond
and A. O’Brien, The Evolution of Cartel Enforcement Over the Last Two
Decades: The US Perspective, in M. Krasnodebski-Tomkiel (ed.) Changes
in Competition Policy Over the Last Two Decades 11 (Polish Office of
Competition and Consumer Protection, 2010); D. C. Klawiter, After the
Deluge: The Powerful Effect of Substantial Criminal Fines, Imprisonment,
and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel Enforcement, (2001) 69
George Washington Law Review 745.

II. Criminal
enforcement
and institutional
interdependencies
10. To assess how criminalisation affects competition law,
it is useful to view the choice of remedies as one feature
of a system of interdependent elements. A change in
one element can alter the operation and importance of
other elements in ways that either accentuate or mute the
impact of the first adjustment. In competition law, “equilibration” responds to perceived imperfections in one
aspect of a legal framework by adjusting other system
elements.8 For example, a court that is concerned that the
remedies mandated by law are excessive when compared
to the harm caused by certain violations may bolster the
liability standard to reduce the number of instances in
which an infringement of the law will be found to exist.
11. A system of competition law has six interdependent
elements: the substantive scope of the legal command,
the volume and quality of evidence required to prove
an infringement, the means for detecting violations, the
prosecution of violations, the adjudication process that
determines guilt or innocence, and the sanctions imposed
for infringements. Each is significant to criminal enforcement of competition law.

1. Substantive scope
of the legal command
12. Competition laws differ in their coverage, but most
address horizontal and vertical agreements, dominant
firm conduct, and mergers. These behaviours vary
significantly according to their perceived competitive
dangers. Competition law specialists agree that cartels

6 A. P. Reindl, How Strong Is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?,
in Cseres, Schinkel and Vogelaar, n. 3, 110, 120.
7 On the United Kingdom policy deliberations leading to legislation in 2002
to criminalise some antitrust offenses, see M. Furse and S. Nash, The Cartel
Offence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
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8 S. Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, (1986) 74 Georgetown Law
Journal 1065.
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4. US experience has much to say about what it takes
to perform these tasks effectively.5 American antitrust
history teaches a crucial lesson: Nothing about building
effective criminal antitrust enforcement is quick or
easy. Success requires years (more precisely, decades) of
arduous, sustained effort.

13. In establishing criminal sanctions, a competition law
could (a) require the competition agency to challenge all
conduct through criminal proceedings, (b) give the agency
discretion to file civil or criminal charges; (c) single out
specific behaviour as subject to criminal sanctions. In
the United States, the Sherman Act makes all covered
conduct subject to criminal prosecution but gives the
DOJ discretion to bring civil cases, as well. An express
narrowing of the underlying statutory command to make
criminal sanctions available only to address demonstrably harmful conduct (i.e., cartels) has the benefit of
providing more complete assurance that prosecutors will
not use criminal process to address behaviour with more
ambiguous competitive effects.

2. Volume and quality of
evidence required to prove a
violation
14. The availability of criminal sanctions affects the
evidentiary burdens that an enforcement agency must
bear in two ways. First, criminal offenses ordinarily must
be established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” whereas
civil offenses generally must be shown by a balancing of
probabilities. To challenge conduct as a crime, the prosecutor must accumulate and present evidence that is more
robust than needed for a civil violation.
15. The second effect concerns the tendency in competition law to form evidentiary presumptions based on
widely held views about the competitive significance
of specific conduct. The general method of analysis in
competition law is a reasonableness assessment which
weighs positive and adverse economic effects. Conduct
that always or almost always yields net economic harm
usually receives a more abbreviated inquiry (“per se” illegality or condemnation by object) that focuses mainly
on whether the parties entered a forbidden category of
agreement.
16. The adoption of a per se prohibition seeks to mark
the zone of illegality clearly. US antitrust law instructs
business managers that the bell of illegality rings at the
moment a firm agrees with a rival to set prices, regardless of actual effects. The bright-line rule weakens a firm’s
capacity to claim that application of criminal process
involved unfair surprise. Rule of reason offenses, which
often involve deeper inquiry into motive and effect,
generally are seen as unsuitable for criminal prosecution.

17. A competition law that treats all offenses as crimes
and allows no possibility for civil prosecution can create
crippling rigidities. The prosecutor not only must prove
all infringements beyond a reasonable doubt, but also
bears the often difficult burden of convincing a jury of
laypersons that the conduct at issue (e.g., a merger) is
grave enough to deserve criminal sanctions. For decades,
this rigidity robbed Canada’s competition system of
effective enforcement. In the United States, as discussed
below, the application of powerful criminal sanctions
became routine and effective only after DOJ adopted a
policy to apply the criminal process only to cartels.
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ordinarily cause economic harm and rarely benefit
society.9 By contrast, a dominant firm’s use of exclusive
dealing is believed to have more ambiguous consequences.

3. Detection of violations
18. By raising the hazards of misconduct, criminal sanctions induce firms to act covertly and take stronger
precautions to avoid generating evidence that establishes
a violation. In US experience, the strengthening of the
enforcement framework (e.g., by adopting more powerful
sanctions) tends to inspire business counterstrategies that
seek to conceal collusion.10
19. As modern evidence with criminal anti-cartel enforcement shows, enforcement agencies and cartel participants
employ, respectively, ever more powerful enforcement
techniques and defensive measures.11 Enforcement of the
Sherman Act drove illicit collaborations underground
and reduced the amount of direct evidence readily available to prosecutors.12 Early judicial decisions established that a jury could rely on circumstantial evidence
to infer an illegal price-fixing agreement,13 yet such proof
provides a less confident basis for a jury to find concerted
action beyond a reasonable doubt.
20. Recent experience has featured numerous efforts
to improve access to direct evidence and to enhance
the evidentiary basis for prosecuting cartels as crimes.
The Justice Department’s leniency reforms of the 1990s
provided strong incentives for firms and individuals to
reveal the existence of unlawful arrangements.14 Today
leniency provides the chief evidentiary means by which
DOJ prosecutes cartels. US experience underscores how
criminal sanctions may require adoption of high-powered information gathering techniques to detect covert
schemes and prosecute them successfully.

10 See K. J. Cseres et al., Law and Economics of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement,
in Cseres, Schinkel and Vogelaar, n. 3, 1, 11.
11 R. Marshall and L. Marx, The Economics of Collusion (Cambridge: MIT
Press 2013).
12 See W. E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying
Informants to Reveal Cartels, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 766,
785–6 (Sherman Act caused cartel members to take greater precautions to
avoid detection and successful prosecution).
13 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 234 US 600,
612 (1914).

9 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Cartels:
Sanctions Against Individuals, (2007) 9 Journal of Competition Law & Policy
7, 36–46 (reviewing modern enforcement trends).

14 On DOJ’s leniency program, see A. O’Brien, Leadership of Leniency, in
C. Beaton-Wells and C. Tran, Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary
Age: Leniency Religion (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015) 17.
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6. Sanctions

21. As noted above, the allocation of law enforcement
authority may complicate the decision to apply criminal
sanctions. In most jurisdictions, the power to prosecute
crimes rests exclusively with the executive branch. In the
United States, an executive department (DOJ) is responsible for criminal antitrust enforcement. DOJ conducts
the investigation, accepts and considers applications for
leniency, negotiates plea agreements, files cases, and litigates trials and appeals. One institution (DOJ) formulates criminal enforcement policy and prosecutes all
criminal cases.

26. The discussion above has highlighted how the perception of judges and juries about the appropriateness of
sanctions can affect the interpretation and application
of legal standards. Moving from lower-powered to higher-powered sanctions generates pressures for courts to
take steps to ensure that higher-powered sanctions are
visited upon genuinely harmful conduct. Courts may
insist that the forbidden acts be well defined (to give clear
notice of what conduct will trigger severe punishment)
and pose serious dangers to society. Jurors in criminal
antitrust cases may want stronger assurances that the
conduct warrants the imprisonment of individuals.

22. In most nations, the principal competition authority is an administrative body which lacks authority to
file criminal cases. To bring criminal antitrust cases, the
competition authority must enlist the assistance of the
executive branch prosecutorial body. Harmonious cooperation seldom materialises immediately or automatically. Substantial, patient effort on behalf of top leadership and case handlers in both institutions is necessary to
make the team effective.
23. One vital frontier of cooperation involves leniency.
Leniency facilitates detection only if prosecutors make
credible commitments to reduce punishment in return for
information. Firms are unlikely to reveal misconduct to
one government body if disclosure may lead to criminal
prosecution by another. In a system of shared authority, the competition agency also must persuade the executive branch prosecutor to devote adequate resources to
criminal antitrust enforcement.

5. Adjudication
24. Successful prosecution of a criminal antitrust case
requires the government to persuade the judge and a jury
that the offense warrants criminal sanctions. Judges and
juries may associate criminal sanctions with offenses such
as murder or robbery; they may not immediately view
antitrust offenses as posing serious dangers. Suppose
judges and jurors think price fixing does not warrant
the imprisonment of culpable individuals. Judges might
interpret the antitrust statute in ways that make it harder
for prosecutors to prevail on criminal antitrust claims.
Juries simply might engage in “nullification” by refusing
to find guilt, regardless of the evidence before them.
25. To obtain convictions of individuals charged with
antitrust crimes, the prosecutor must build awareness
that the challenged behaviour is truly pernicious. Outside
the courtroom, this education process involves speeches,
media appearances, and other forms of outreach to
emphasise the harm of antitrust misconduct. Inside the
courtroom, the prosecutor must demonstrate the grave
social hazards of the defendant’s acts. As described
below, modern US experience underscores the value, in
building a criminal enforcement program, of selecting
cases that involve readily apparent harm.
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The decision to challenge conduct
as a crime or a civil offense is entrusted
to DOJ’s discretion
27. In the United States, concerns about the scope of
criminal enforcement have led to a significant narrowing
of conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The Sherman
Act provides no criteria to guide the choice between
criminal and civil proceedings. The decision to challenge
conduct as a crime or a civil offense is entrusted to DOJ’s
discretion. From 1890 until the early 1970s, DOJ generally focused criminal enforcement on cartels, yet some
prosecutions in this period challenged non-cartel offenses
as crimes. In the early 1960s, the DOJ brought criminal
charges against firms (and individuals) accused of illegal
monopolisation.15
28. The 1970s marked an important turn in US enforcement policy. In 1974, Congress raised the Sherman Act
criminal offense from a misdemeanour to a felony. DOJ
subsequently narrowed the behaviour subject to criminal
sanctions. Since 1974, with the exception of a single
resale price maintenance case,16 DOJ has applied criminal
enforcement to cartel behaviour only.17 The increase from
1974 onward in the severity of criminal sanctions created
a policy imperative to ensure that only grievous misconduct receives criminal sanctions. To do otherwise could
raise questions about the fairness of US antitrust enforcement and create doubts about its political legitimacy.

15 In 1963, DOJ obtained an indictment for illegal monopolisation against
United Fruit and several of its executives for oversupplying Los Angeles
with bananas. United States v. United Fruit Co., [1961–1970 Transfer Binder]
Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) ¶ 45,063 (CD Cal, filed July 16, 1963).
16 United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc, 1981 WL 2062 (D Conn 1981).
17 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations 297
(Apr. 2007) (“The DOJ has made quite clear that it does not currently
prosecute anything other than hard-core cartel activity criminally, and it has
no plans to change that policy in the future.”).
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4. Prosecution

methods. Experimentation sometimes involves bringing
cases or applying remedies of a sort not previously prosecuted; in other instances, the experiment entails withholding prosecution for a matter that might have been
challenged in the past. Routine evaluations of past
enforcement measures provide an essential ingredient for
deciding which policies to pursue in the future.

29. “Norms” are consensus views about how members
of a group ought to behave.18 By contrast to formal legal
commands, norms are customs or standards that members
of a group develop voluntarily and apply to themselves.
Antitrust systems operate within a statutory framework,
but formal mandates usually give enforcement agencies
discretion to decide how to implement the formal rules.
In many jurisdictions, enforcement agencies play a central
role in determining how the commands will be applied.
Formal legal rules define the outer boundaries of the
agencies’ operations, but the agencies often develop
norms that shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

IV. The Development
of modern US
antitrust criminal
enforcement norms

30. When a competition agency adjusts enforcement
norms, it must account for the preferences and likely
reactions of various external audiences. As mentioned
above, successful implementation of a criminal enforcement program requires enforcement officials to persuade
courts that certain antitrust offenses deserve criminal
sanctions. In criminal antitrust enforcement, DOJ has
engaged in a continuing interaction with the courts
with the aim of demonstrating the sensibility of its law
enforcement program. After the statutory reforms of
1974, DOJ carefully chose matters whose suitability for
criminal prosecution would be most evident to a judge or
a jury. DOJ also used speeches and issued guidelines to
clarify for business officials and their advisors its criminal
enforcement intentions.
31. Whatever the exact process of change, antitrust
enforcement norms are certain to change over time.
This flows from the inherently evolutionary character of
competition policy.19 The policy evolution that successfully introduces criminal sanctions is likely to be incremental and cumulative. Dramatic adjustments sometimes take place, but they ordinarily are not followed by
dramatic changes that entirely or largely restore the status
quo ante. New ideas or theories can modify, sometimes
dramatically, an existing intellectual framework, but the
“new” idea often has antecedents in earlier thinking.
The intellectual status quo at any moment usually reflects
a synthesis of older and newer thinking rather than a
wholesale displacement of earlier perspectives.
32. Competition policy has a substantial experimental quality. Officials identify the “right” mix of cases
over time by testing different theories and enforcement

18 R. D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, (1994) 14 International Review of Law & Economics
215, 218. The discussion of norms and criminal enforcement here builds upon
the treatment in W. E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of US Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 377.
19 State Oil Co v. Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997) (in antitrust, Supreme Court has
distinctive role “in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and
the lessons of accumulated experience”).
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III. Norms and
criminal antitrust
enforcement

33. Since the Sherman Act’s earliest days, the prosecution of cartels has supplied the core of federal antitrust enforcement. Modern US experience indicates that
building a successful criminal antitrust program is a
long, cumulative process in which agencies test and refine
enforcement techniques.
34. The Justice Department’s prosecution of criminal
antitrust violations advanced through several phases in
the second half of the 20th century and into the beginning of the 21st century. A pivotal development in the
late 1950s and early1960s was the successful prosecution of cases against producers of turbine generators
and other equipment used to produce and transmit electricity.20 The electrical equipment cases yielded prison
terms for a number of company executives. Although
the sentences served (a few weeks) pale in comparison to
incarceration periods that later became routine, the prosecutions helped build business and public awareness that
horizontal price fixing grossly violated competition law
and warranted incarceration.
35. The second key steps took place in the 1970s. In 1974,
Congress elevated the Sherman Act criminal offense
from misdemeanour to felony; increased the maximum
prison sentence for individuals from one year to three;
and boosted the maximum fine from $50,000 to $100,000
for individuals and from $50,000 to $1 million for corporations.21 In 1955, Congress raised the amount to $50,000
from the original Sherman Act amount of $5,000.
36. The evolution of US antitrust fines from 1890 to
1974 underscores an important point about the criminal
punishments. The prospect of any criminal punishment likely chastened business managers whose careers
would end or decline by the mere fact of sentencing.
Yet the deterrent impact on the business entity may be

20 On DOJ’s prosecution of the electrical equipment conspiracies, see
J. G. Fuller, The Gentleman Conspirators: The Story of the Price-Fixers in
the Electrical Industry (Grove Press 1962).
21 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 USC).
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establish the social and political legitimacy and regularity of severe criminal sanctions for cartels. By the early
1990s, the fact of routine prosecution and severe punishment had become accepted elements of the nation’s
competition policy.

37. The 1980s featured further enhancements to criminal
sanctions for antitrust offenses. In this decade the Reagan
administration pressed for increases in statutory sanctions and sentencing policy reforms that would increase
the average prison term served by individuals guilty of
antitrust offenses. In 1984 Congress created a new mechanism for calculating criminal fines that permits the
maximum Sherman Act fine for corporations and individuals to be set at twice the loss suffered by victims or
twice the gain realised by the offender.23 The doublethe-loss, double-the-gain mechanism would supply the
basis for the eight- and nine-figure recoveries in the food
additives, graphite electrodes, vitamins, and art auction
cartel cases in the 1990s.24 In 1987 new federal sentencing guidelines took effect and increased the likelihood
that individuals convicted of Sherman Act offenses will
serve longer prison terms.25 In 1990, Congress raised the
maximum Sherman Act fine for individuals to $350,000
from $100,000 and for corporations to $10 million from
$1 million.26

40. DOJ criminal enforcement through the early 1990s
focused heavily on public procurements to construct or
improve major infrastructure assets. The emphasis on
public procurement played an important part in helping
to build broad social and political acceptance for the idea
that cartels should be condemned strictly and that individuals engaged in misconduct should be imprisoned.
One way to socialise acceptance of strict criminal penalties for collusion is to target activities that society regards
as contemptible. Theft from the public treasury through
bid rigging is such an offense.

38. Enforcement since 1970 increased in parallel with
enhancements in sanctions. In the 1970s, the Antitrust Division expanded efforts to prosecute collusion
criminally. DOJ in the 1980s and early 1990s further
augmented criminal enforcement. From 1981 through
1988, DOJ initiated more criminal prosecutions than the
total of government criminal antitrust cases from 1890
to 1980; the Department continued to emphasise imprisonment for individual offenders.27 In the late 1980s and
early 1990s DOJ pioneered the use of criminal actions to
prosecute invitations to collude.28
39. By the end of the George H. W. Bush Administration in 1992, the legislative and policy adjustments of the
previous two decades had accomplished several important ends. The augmented sanctions increased the likelihood of imprisonment for guilty individuals and
boosted DOJ’s ability to seek large fines from companies.
The aggressive prosecution of cartel schemes served to

22 See Baker, supra n. 5, 705 (describing evolution of US criminal enforcement
scheme).
23 18 USC §§ 3571(d) (1994). Congress first enacted this provision in the
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat 3143,
and reenacted the measure in the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-185, 100 Stat 1279.
24 See Klawiter, supra note 5 (discussing double the loss, double the gain fine).
25 The sentencing guidelines for antitrust offenses appear at USSG § 2R1.1
(2005).
26 Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588 (1990), 104
Stat 2880 (codified at 15 USC §§ 1, 2).
27 See Baker, supra n 5, 695–96, 705–07.
28 See United States v. Ames Sintering Co, 927 F2d 232, 236 (6th Cir 1990)
(per curiam) (upholding convictions for wire fraud and attempted wire
fraud resulting from defendant’s attempt to arrange bid-rigging scheme by
telephone).
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41. The 1990s brought important innovations in cartel
detection. Since the early 1980s, federal enforcement officials had increased their ability to obtain direct evidence
of collusion. The Antitrust Division resorted more
extensively to wire-tapping and electronic surveillance
and broadened cooperation with other law enforcement
entities and government bureaus.29 In 1993 and 1994
DOJ expanded leniency to increase incentives for cartel
participants to inform.30 Better detection and enhanced
sanctions spurred major enforcement breakthroughs in
the 1990s.31 From 1995 through 2000 DOJ collected more
fines for antitrust crimes than it obtained from 1890 to
1994. From the vitamins cartel alone, DOJ obtained
hundreds of millions of dollars in criminal fines32 and
gained prison terms for individual offenders, including
foreign nationals.33
42. In the 2000s, the US criminal enforcement program
obtained additional upgrades. In 2004 Congress adopted
the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement and Reform
Act, which increased the maximum prison sentence for
individuals to ten years; lifted the maximum fine for individuals to $1 million; raised the Sherman Act fine for
corporations to $100 million; and reduced the exposure
of certain leniency applicants in private treble damage
follow-on suits.34

29 See J. Whalley, Priorities and Practices—The Antitrust Division’s Criminal
Enforcement Program, (1988) 57 Antitrust Law Journal 569, 571-2
(describing expanded use of wiretaps and other surveillance techniques to
gather evidence of illegal collusion).
30 US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Corporate Leniency Policy
(10 August 1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) § 13,113;
US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Individual Leniency Policy
(10 August 1994), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) § 13,114.
31 See G. R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants
for Reporting Violations, (2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 798
(describing criminal enforcement accomplishments of 1990s).
32 Hoffman La Roche and BASF paid criminal fines of $500 million and
$225 million, respectively, to resolve DOJ’s claims.
33 See H. First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecution and the Coming of
International Competition Law, (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 711, 716-18
(describing guilty pleas by foreign nationals in Vitamins case).
34 Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215(a), 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004).
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weak unless the fines are formidable. By the early 1970s,
a maximum fine of $50,000 was a laughably small sum.
In the mid- to late 1970s, DOJ urged courts to apply the
enhanced penalties vigorously and pressed to make the
imprisonment of culpable individuals routine.22

V. Conclusion:
Institutional
implications
44. The impact of a system of legal commands depends
vitally on the institutions created to execute them.36 Close
study of US experience illuminates the special institutional demands of a criminal enforcement regime and
identifies how a jurisdiction might best implement a
system of criminal sanctions.

1. Transparency
45. Through the meaningful disclosure of processes,
policies, and decisions, competition agencies promote
clarity, increase understanding, and discipline their
exercise of discretion by subjecting their actions to
external review and criticism. Transparency guides
business operators about the content of and rationale for specific decisions and helps ensure the regularity and honesty of public administration. This quality is
especially significant for criminal enforcement. Because
criminal sanctions are the most powerful means by which
a society can enforce its laws, a government agency must
take additional measures to ensure that their application
is sensible.

35 See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, (1986) 55 Antitrust Law Journal 255, 260 (discussing
Reagan Administration’s support for sentencing reforms that would increase
prison terms served by individuals guilty of price fixing).
36 See J.-J. Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in
B. Pleskovic and J. E. Stiglitz (eds.), Annual World Bank Conference on
Development Economics 1998 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999)
237 (discussing institutional foundations for successful competition policy
systems).

46. Recognising how enforcement norms develop and
change over time underscores the importance of transparency devices. Policies that commit the agency to
reveal information about how it exercises the decision to
prosecute help inform the competition policy community about the content of enforcement norms within the
agency and permit discussion about whether existing
norms are worthy of adjustment. Extensive public discussion before the enactment of a criminal enforcement
regime and revelation of the agency’s enforcement intentions during the process of implementation serve to build
needed acceptance for criminal sanctions and to establish
their political legitimacy.
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43. The progressive enhancement and increasingly
successful implementation of DOJ’s criminal enforcement program from the late 1950s to the present has
built upon a commonly held belief about the competition policy role of criminal prosecutions. After the 1974
legislative reforms, DOJ’s leadership made criminal prosecution DOJ’s highest competition policy priority. Each
decade’s accomplishments—ascending levels of cases
prosecuted, fines collected, individuals imprisoned, and
average length of sentences served—rested upon the
contributions of previous decades. In each period DOJ
rolled out new enforcement approaches, tested the policy
“prototypes,” assessed the results, expanded the use of
successful techniques, and pursued necessary modifications in Congress or by means committed to the Department’s discretion.35 A commitment to continued improvement underpinned this process.

2. Institution building
47. Antitrust agencies arrive at a given policy equilibrium
by periodically expanding and contracting the zone of
enforcement. Testing the validity of different hypotheses involves making enforcement decisions that calculate
risks about intervening too aggressively or not intervening enough. Without experiments that sometimes intervene too much or sometimes intervene too little, enforcement authorities could not determine the correct mix
of policies. As noted below, the experimental quality of
competition policy demands that the agency periodically
assess the effects of chosen policies.
48. US experience shows that the success of criminal
enforcement programs depends upon the willingness
of leadership to make long-term investments to build
administrative capacity and to enhance the agency’s
reputation. This requires fidelity to a norm that emphasises long-term institutional improvement and discourages the inclination to focus chiefly on measures that
generate immediately appropriable results for incumbent leadership.37 US experience underscores how the
construction of the US criminal antitrust program was a
slow growth, and its success has hinged upon investments
made in each decade in each key element of the enforcement program.
49. Among the most important means to achieve policy
improvements is to embrace a norm favouring ex post
assessment of outcomes.38 A habit of evaluation can
perform the broader function of placing individual
policy initiatives in a larger historical context. By seeing
how policy actually evolves, agencies can better understand what they must do to improve performance.

37 See H. Heclo, The Spirit of Public Administration, (2002) 35 PS: Political
Science & Politics 689, 691 (“Nothing closes so many doors on real
opportunity as opportunism. A person who is forever weighing the odds of
immediate success can never believe in anything long enough to make it
succeed.”); W. E. Kovacic and D. A. Hyman, Consume or Invest? What Do/
Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, University of Washington Law Review
(Forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705919.
38 On the importance of ex post assessment as an element of competition policy,
see W. E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance
of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 503
(2006).
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antitrust law, but they can provide an accurate prediction of the institutional challenges that criminalisation
entails. To know these challenges in advance creates the
best possible opportunity to prepare for and surmount
them. For criminal enforcement, careful study of the US
experience is an indispensable part of this comparative
inquiry. n
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I. Introduction
1. This article draws on the findings of four surveys
carried out in 2014 to answer the question of whether
there is public support for cartel criminalisation.1 Following the proliferation of substantive competition laws
and then leniency programs, one of the most distinctive
trends in global antitrust over the past decade has been
the increasing number of jurisdictions that can impose
criminal sanctions on individuals and/or firms responsible for cartel conduct. These typically exist alongside civil enforcement regimes and are reserved for the
most serious horizontal restrictions. The countries with
criminal cartel laws number around 25-30 (depending
on how one defines a criminal cartel offence), but this
does not include jurisdictions that apply criminal sanctions only to bid rigging (sometimes restricted to public
procurement). While the increasing number of criminal
cartel offences poses a number of challenges for competition lawyers advising multinational firms, the level of
actual enforcement outside the United States is still very
low, with only a handful of individuals ever having served
custodial sentences in other jurisdictions.2

1 For a summary of the full results, see: A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes
to Price Fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA, CCP Working Paper
15-8.
2 See A. Stephan, Four Key Challenges to the Successful Criminalization of
Cartel Laws (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(2) pp. 333–362.
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2. The trend towards criminalisation is likely to continue,
but diverging approaches to enforcement are already
emerging. Perhaps the most obvious of these is within
the European Union, where around 11 of the EU’s 28
Member States have criminal cartel laws, while a number
of others have explicitly rejected them. Reasons for
rejecting cartel criminalisation range from fears about
undermining leniency programs to objections from
the business community.3 Moreover, there have been
no moves to criminalise cartel laws on the European
Community level. Administrative fines and criminal
antitrust enforcement actually serve the same function.
Indeed, for the purposes of the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Strasbourg Court has made clear that
administrative antitrust fines are of a “criminal nature”
and must comply with fundamental rights.4 At their core,
both enforcement approaches impose a punitive sanction
and seek to achieve some level of deterrence so as to
protect individual consumers and the wider economy
from serious anticompetitive harm.

3 See, for example: Practical Law, Swedish Competition Authority Opposes
Proposal to Criminalise Cartels (31 May 2005); A. Stephan, New Zealand
Rejects Cartel Criminalization for the Wrong Reasons (9 December 2015)
Competition Policy Blog; and Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority,
Report on the Criminalisation of Cartels was Presented to Stakeholders
(28 May 2014), available: http://www.kkv.fi/en/current-issues/pressreleases/2014/report-on-the-criminalisation-of-cartels-was-presented-tostakeholders (accessed 25 Jan 2016).
4 See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (2011) App No. 43509/08. See,
generally: A. Scordamaglia-Tousis, EU Cartel Enforcement: Reconciling
Effective Public Enforcement with Fundamental Rights (Kluwer 2013).
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50. The tasks of system design and evaluation for criminal
enforcement can benefit considerably from comparative
study. Each jurisdiction considering or implementing a
criminal enforcement program can benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions that already have set out on a
policy path. Comparative study and international cooperation may not provide perfect answers to each challenge
that a jurisdiction faces in considering criminalisation of

3. Criminalisation is being driven largely by deterrence
theory, which tends to assume that cartelists weigh the
expected benefits and costs of collusion and decide
whether to engage in the activity accordingly.5 Viewing
cartel conduct from this perspective, there is a growing
realisation that administrative sanctions alone (which
are usually some form of financial penalty) may not be
enough to discourage the most damaging forms of cartel
conduct.6 Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses
treat administrative fines as a cost of doing business and
empirically we know that antitrust fines may not exceed
the illegal profits earned by cartel members.7 As any individual monetary sanctions can be indemnified as part of
cartel arrangements, a purely administrative enforcement
regime does not adequately reach the individual decision
makers responsible for cartel conduct. Indeed, the length
of time between cartel formation and the imposition of
administrative fines is such that those responsible for the
conduct may very well have retired or moved to another
firm.8 It is thought that only the threat of imprisonment
serves to deter those individuals. Its power is clear from
the enforcement success of the US Department of Justice
and the fact that, anecdotally at least, some international
conspiracies appear to be avoiding the United States.9
4. However, using the criminal law in antitrust is controversial. Many view it as an extreme form of regulatory
control and argue that it is wrong to use the criminal law
to prevent a largely “morally neutral” activity. Traditionally, criminal offences are reserved for the most serious
and objectionable acts in society. The trend towards
“over-criminalisation” risks eroding the power and significance of the criminal law, ultimately weakening the deterrent effect of all criminal offences. Specifically, the traditionalists’ objection to a criminal antitrust offence is that
it is not clearly underpinned by the prevention of social
harm and by morality.10 Morality is perhaps of particular significance because cartel laws generally punish the
entering into of a cartel agreement, not its harmful effects.

Indeed antitrust laws are rarely concerned with whether a
hard-core cartel arrangement actually achieved any harm
or was even successfully implemented. If the person on
the street cannot easily identify the harm or describe what
is objectionable about the act of price fixing, say, then one
might argue it is appropriate that antitrust be regulated by
civil, not criminal law.
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II. Framing the
criminalisation
debate

The difficulties associated with building
a prosecution around dishonesty
5. Some point to the UK’s experience of cartel criminalisation as proof of this. The original cartel offence
introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 only applied to
individuals who acted “dishonestly.” It was hoped the
offence would “send out a strong message to the perpetrators, their colleagues in business, the general public and
the courts.”11 This suggested there were some doubts as
to whether each of those constituent groups understood
why cartels were objectionable. This appears to have been
confirmed by the difficulties associated with building a
prosecution around dishonesty. The first criminal cartel
trial to be contested before a jury only came in 2015 and
resulted in two defendants being acquitted based solely
on the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses,
casting doubt on the existence of dishonesty.12 Some
point to the many difficulties associated with the dishonesty test, arguing that the case simply vindicated the UK
Government’s decision to drop the dishonesty requirement in 2014 and replace it with a series of carve outs and
defences where there is no secrecy.13 Yet others believe
that an attempt to use the criminal law to increase deterrence and the moral opprobrium of an activity that is
not already widely regarded as being immoral is wrong.14
Williams notes, “this amounts to a kind of legal alchemy
which ultimately will not work, and instead risks damaging
the moral credibility of the criminal law more generally.”15

There is something unsatisfactory about
describing price fixing as theft or fraud
6. Most responses to this criticism seek to draw parallels
between cartel conduct and either fraud or theft. This is
evident in the language used by competition authority officials, even in jurisdictions where the only sanctions available are in fact administrative. The most famous expression of this parallel with traditional property offences
probably comes from Klein, who spoke of price fixing as

5 G. Becker, (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of
Political Economy, 76, 169.
6 See Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), A World Class Competition
Regime (London: The Stationery Office, 2001), Cm.5233, §§ 7.13-7.18.
7 E. Combe and C. Monnier, Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe:
The Myth of Over Enforcement (2009) Cahiers de Recherche PRISMSorbonne Working Paper; C. Craycraft, Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s
Ability to Pay (1997) Review of Industrial Organization 12, 17.
8 A. Stephan, The Direct Settlement of EC Cartel Cases (July 2009) ICLQ 58(3)
pp. 627–654.

11 Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Hansard HC Deb
vol. 383 col 48 (10 April 2002).
12 R v. Dean and Stringer (2015) Southwark Crown Court, unreported. See also
Competition and Markets Authority, CMA statement following completion of
criminal cartel prosecution (24 June 2015).
13 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s. 47.

9 D. I. Baker, Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?
in C. Beaton-Wells and A. Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical
Studies of an International Regulatory Movement, (Oxford: Hart, 2011).

14 A. Jones and R. Williams, The UK Response to the Global Effort Against
Cartels: Is Criminalization Really the Solution? (2014) Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement 2(1) pp. 100–125.

10 See, for example: J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Gray (ed.), On Liberty and Other
Essays (Oxford: OUP 1991), and Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals
(Oxford: OUP 1965).

15 R. Williams, Cartels in the Criminal Law Landscape, in C. Beaton Wells and
A. Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International
Regulatory Movement, (Oxford: Hart 2011), p. 312.
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7. In the context of price fixing, output restriction and
market sharing, demonstrating a positive deception
becomes a little more difficult. First there is the fact antitrust laws make no effort to estimate the actual harm
caused by a cartel, despite the fact the strongest justification for criminalising cartel conduct lies in the enormous
amount of economic harm caused by such arrangements.
The second problem is that without fairly sophisticated
analysis, it is not easy to identify the harm, as this would
require some estimation of the counterfactual. Where,
for example, three firms form a cartel out of crisis and
the alternative would have been one of the three firms
going bust and leaving a duopoly, prices may not have
been very different absent the cartel. The final problem
is that the deception—giving the appearance of competition when in fact there is none—requires that consumers expect markets to be competitive and that prices are
calculated by firms independently of each other. Wardhaugh goes further, asserting that in a liberal society that
relies largely on the free market economy, cartels strike
at an important institution, hindering individuals’ ability
to secure their own well-being.17 One might consider, for
example, the fact that some consumers will be priced
out of the market and denied access to certain products,
because cartels tend to reduce output and raise prices to
levels beyond the reach of poorer buyers, in pursuit of
higher profit. As Whelan notes in his excellent analysis of
the criminalisation question, there are actually a number
of theoretical, legal and practical aspects to cartel criminalisation and these must be considered together in order
to give a meaningful and comprehensive evaluation.18

III. Studying public
perceptions and
criminalisation
8. It is therefore with some caution that this paper
now turns to the issue of consumers’ expectations and
perceptions. These are important to the criminalisation question in a number of respects. First, if consumers expect markets to be competitive and for separate
undertakings to set their prices independently of each
other, this lends support to any arguments for criminalisation centred on deception. While cartels may be able
to function without the need to make a positive deception of the kind we would expect in a traditional fraud
(e.g. making statements to customers that are completely
untrue), they tend to be highly clandestine. Cartels
almost universally go to great lengths to hide the arrangement—in particular by operating outside the institutions
of the firm and communicating covertly. However, there
is a whole host of commercially sensitive information
that firms withhold from consumers. The argument that
a clandestine cartel amounts to a deception only holds if
consumers expect competition to be the norm. Second,
they help us understand the extent to which members
of the public consider cartel practices to be objectionable and deserving of punishment. This alone may not be
justification for imposing criminal sanctions, but it does
help us understand whether they are viewed as purely
regulatory matters. Views of whether cartels should
be punished also help us understand whether ordinary
consumers (many of whom may serve procurement functions of various kinds in their professions) recognise the
harmful effects of cartels without the need to demonstrate a quantifiable overcharge. This would lend some
support to a social harm basis for cartel criminalisation.
9. The survey projects used to assist us in exploring the
abovementioned issues were carried out online between
27 June and 15 July 2014, by YouGov Plc in the UK,
Germany and the US, and in cooperation with Research
Now in Italy. The sample was selected from online panels
and drawn to be representative of the general population in each country according to a list of demographic
characteristics. The sample sizes were: 2,509 (UK); 2,648
(Germany); 2,521 (Italy); and 2,913 (USA). The study
was a follow-up of a 2007 survey carried out only in the
UK19 and asked a variety of questions relating to price
fixing. Questions generally gave respondents two alternative options and were asked to indicate which they agreed
with more.20

16 J. Klein, The Antitrust Division’s International Anti-Cartel Enforcement
Program, Speech at the American Bar Association Spring Meeting,
Washington, D.C., April 6, 2000.
17 B. Wardhaugh, Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative Justification for the
Criminalisation of Economic Collusion (Cambridge: CUP 2014).
18 P. Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement:
Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges (Oxford: OUP 2014).
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19 A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel
Enforcement (2007) CCP Working Paper 07–12.
20 Full question wording available in the working paper: Stephan 2015 (n. 1).
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being “nothing more than theft by well-dressed thieves.”16
Yet there is something unsatisfactory about describing
price fixing as theft or fraud. It does not usually involve
violence or result in a critical mass of harm that can be
easily identified. Crucially it is questionable whether the
level of deception in cartel conduct is strong enough to
amount to a fraud. This is perhaps more straightforward
in the context of bid rigging because bidders deliberately
submit false bids in manipulation of what is clearly a
process that invites competitive bids. It explains why bid
rigging is treated more harshly than other forms of cartel
conduct in some jurisdictions.

10. One of the most significant findings of the surveys
was that around two thirds of respondents in the UK,
Germany and Italy expected “each business they buy from
to have set their prices independently of each other” and
objected to “firms talking with each other about the prices
they charge.” The proportion in the US was just over half.
Less than one in three felt it was normal for competing
businesses to talk to each other about prices, and that
proportion was only one in five in the UK. These findings
suggest consumers are far from indifferent to the way
firms calculate their prices. It also suggests that where
competing firms depart from the competitive process
and cease calculating prices independently of each
other, most consumers will continue to assume prices are
competitive unless they are told otherwise by the firms.
Attempts, therefore to hide or suppress the disclosure of
information about the existence of a cartel, may amount
to a significant deception.
11. Throughout the survey results it is surprising how
uniform attitudes to price fixing were between the
European countries and how they were comparatively
weak in the United States. Indeed this was despite some
significant differences in attitudes to the role of government and the free market. Almost two thirds of Americans believed “that a free market economy, in which government control is kept to a minimum, is the best economic
system for creating wealth and prosperity.” By contrast
almost half of Italians believed “that wealth and prosperity can be better achieved through greater government intervention in the economy.” This would suggest that expectations about independent pricing are not closely linked
to perceptions of the free market in the way some may
expect. Perhaps the expectation of independent pricing
is more to do with values of fairness than faith in the
benefits of the competitive free market process.

2. Is the act of price fixing
considered objectionable?
12. In all four jurisdictions a strong majority of respondents (79% GB; 78% DE; 73% IT; 66% US) recognised price
fixing as a harmful practice that was deserving of punishment. It is notable that in all jurisdictions other than Italy
those unsure were greater in number than those who felt
price fixing was a harmless practice that should be left
unpunished. The survey questions were silent on how
price fixing was treated in law by each of the four jurisdictions. Indeed, despite such a high proportion of respondents recognising cartel conduct as a harmful conduct that
deserved punishment, there was a significant amount of
uncertainty as to whether price fixing was actually illegal.
Only 53% of Britons and Italians thought price fixing
was illegal and, surprisingly, only 41% of Americans.
The proportion in Germany was significantly higher
(75%), but this may have been due to a number of high
profile cartel cases that occurred in Germany over the
six-month period immediately preceding the fieldwork

and the Bundeskartellamt’s efforts in recent years to
target infringements involving consumer products. When
asked to explain why they felt price fixing was a harmful
practice deserving of punishment, respondents strongly
related to statements indicating price fixing was harmful,
unethical, immoral and dishonest. There was even overwhelming support in all four jurisdictions for price fixing
to be treated as a “crime.” Unfortunately this question
proved of limited use as it was unclear whether respondents had understood the difference between a crime and
other forms of illegality. Nevertheless, it would therefore
appear that, despite obvious confusion about how cartels
are actually treated in law, a strong majority of respondents in each of the four jurisdictions recognised price
fixing as objectionable and harmful enough to deserve
punishment.
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1. Do consumers expect
independent pricing decisions?

13. In order to determine how objectionable consumers felt price fixing was, the surveys turned to questions
about sanctions and comparisons with more traditional
forms of wrongdoing. These revealed some limitations
to popular perceptions. While there was strong support
for public naming and shaming, the imposition of corporate fines exceeding the illegal profits, and a personal
fine for individuals responsible, support for imprisonment of those individuals was comparatively weak (27%
UK; 28% Germany; 26% IT; 36% US). It is important to
note that the question asked specifically about imprisonment and this implied incarceration. Therefore the level
of support for criminal enforcement (for example where
first offenders get a suspended sentence) may be higher.
While a majority of respondents in the UK, Germany
and the US felt price fixing was of equivalent severity
to fraud, at least 40% in all four jurisdictions felt fraud
and theft was more serious. Opinions were also divided
about how price fixing compared to other forms of financial crime. Respondents generally felt price fixing was
comparable to tax evasion (50% UK; 41% DE; 35% IT;
44% US) and insider trading (56% UK; 49% DE; 41% IT;
47% US), but many felt even these practices were more
serious (Tax evasion: 45% UK; 52% DE; 59% IT; 48%
US. Insider trading: 29% UK; 31% DE; 43% IT; 39%
US). Price fixing compared far less favourably against
misleading consumers about the safety of goods (more
serious than price fixing: 64% UK; 59% DE; 75% IT; 63%
US) and driving while under the influence of drink or
drugs (more serious than price fixing: 76% UK; 69% DE;
84% IT; 69% US). Out of the range of other misbehaviour put to respondents, a strong majority only agreed
that price fixing was more serious than a person illegally
downloading music. These are likely to reflect the remote
nature of the harm caused by cartel conduct and suggest
that respondents do not fully appreciate the magnitude
or extent of the economic harm cartels are capable of
achieving.
14. Despite these limitations, it is worth noting that
support for imprisonment in the UK was only 11% in the
2007 study (amounting to a threefold increase in support)
and the proportion of people who felt price fixing was
dishonest also appears to have increased significantly.
The weak results from the US suggest any hardening
in attitudes may have little to do with rigorous antitrust
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IV. Concluding
remarks
15. The findings of the survey study suggest that consumers do expect competing businesses to calculate prices
independently of each other. They also suggest a clear
sentiment that cartel practices are objectionable because
they result in harmful price increases and are deserving
of punishment. These appear to satisfy the morality and
social harm prerequisites to criminalisation, especially as
the clandestine nature of cartel arrangements appears to
strengthen arguments that they amount to a deception.
Yet there are clear limitations to this. While cartels may
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not be “morally neutral” in quite the way some critics
of criminalisation suggest, especially as around half of
respondents across the board feel it is as serious as fraud,
some struggle to equate it to other types of wrongdoing,
some of which are arguably significantly less harmful
than price fixing. The weak support for imprisonment is
also problematic because the custodial sentence is key to
the deterrence objective of cartel criminalisation. Proponents of criminalisation will find it difficult to depart
from calls for custodial sentences for as long as there are
no viable administrative sanctions against individuals
that cannot be indemnified by the cartel.

16. Neither side of the criminalisation debate is likely to
have been converted by the analysis in this paper. Public
perceptions are another instructive element which help us
further develop the discourse on cartel criminalisation—
especially in relation to normative arguments, criticisms
and justifications. They should not be taken as definitive
indicators of whether criminalisation is justified or viable
in practical terms. The US has enjoyed significant success
in cartel criminalisation, yet the survey results suggest it
is far from a special case when it comes to public perceptions. Practical and institutional aspects of criminalisation may be of equal importance. n
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enforcement, as one would expect the American respondents to be far more willing to condemn price fixing. It may
instead reflect increased awareness and anger towards
corporate wrongdoing following the financial crisis and
well-publicised cases such as Libor manipulation. Any
such effects of the financial crisis and their extent are
hard to estimate and need further research. Finally, it
could simply be due to poor information dissemination
and coverage of antitrust issues in the popular media.
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